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The Uniform Rights of The Terminally III Act:
Too Little, Too Late?
Marguerite Ann Chapman*
I. INTRODUCTION
The graying of America and the greater incidence of life-
threatening illness associated with aging have intensified inter-
est in living wills and other legal mechanisms designed to give
the patient, or a trusted proxy, control over the use of life-
prolonging medical technology.' In addition, the AIDS epi-
demic has generated greater interest in advance planning to
determine the degree to which life-extending treatment will be
administered to terminally ill patients who no longer have
* Associate Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A., 1973, J.D.,
1976, University of Arkansas (Fayetteville); LL.M., 1985, George Washington Univer-
sity. This article is an outgrowth of a paper entitled "The United States' New Uniform
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act," which the author presented at "Sydney '86: An
International Conference on Health Law and Ethics" on August 19, 1986, in Sydney,
Australia. The author wishes to thank Alice V. Mehling, Executive Director, and
Fenella Rouse, Director of Legal Services, of the Society for the Right to Die, 250 West
57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10107, for their assistance in providing information about
legislative developments and unreported cases, including copies of pleadings and lower
court orders. All who endeavor to secure and enhance the rights of dying patients are
indebted to this organization for the excellent work it has done. However, unless other-
wise indicated, the views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the position of the
Society for the Right to Die or its staff. The author expresses appreciation to the Uni-
versity of Tulsa for the Faculty Development Summer Research Grant used to support
part of this research and to Martin R. Steinmetz, whose excellent work as a research
assistant facilitated the completion of this article.
1. See Verbrugge, Longer Life but Worsening Health? Trends in Health and Mor-
tality of Middle-Aged and Older Persons, 62 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 475 (1984)
(documenting an increase in the incidence and impact of life-threatening illness, such as
cancer and stroke, as people live to more advanced ages). But see Fuchs, "Though
Much Is Taken ": Aging, Health, and Medical Care, 62 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.
143 (1984) (expressing reservations about the suggested causal relationship between
chronic illness and increased longevity).
For an incisive and provocative examination of the proper goals of medicine in a
rapidly aging society, see generally D. CALLAHAN, SETrING LIMITS, MEDICAL GOALS
IN AN AGING SOCIETY 52-81, 159-200 (1987) (asserting that a disproportionate share of
health-care resources is spent on extending the lives of the elderly with little thought for
the quality of those lives). For an excellent resource on health-care planning considera-
tions associated with aging and Alzheimer's disease and related dementing disorders,
see UNDERSTANDING ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE 265-322 (M. Aronson ed. 1988).
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capacity to make health-care decisions.2 The completion of
the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act3 (URTIA) was a
significant milestone in nearly a decade of efforts by the states
to fashion legislative solutions to the profound ethical and
legal dilemmas presented by terminally ill or permanently un-
conscious patients.4
When the URTIA was approved in August of 1985 by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, the initial three-year period following the promulgation
of the act was viewed by some to be the most critical time
frame in which to assess the impact of this new uniform law.
Because 1987 marked a new biennium in which most states'
legislatures would meet, that year was considered to be partic-
ularly significant.5 Now that the three-year mark has passed,
2. See Special Report, Preferences of Homosexual Men with AIDS for Life-
Sustaining Treatment, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 457 (1986). The AIDS patients sur-
veyed in this study wanted their partners or friends, rather than family members, to
confer with their attending physicians in making medical treatment decisions. Id. at
457. However, the report noted that the patient's partner or friend "has no legal stand-
ing to make decisions unless designated as a proxy through a durable power of attorney
for health care." Id.
See also Malcolm, Letting Victims Halt Treatment, AIDS Brings Expanded Debate
on Rights of the Terminally Ill, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1987, at 6, col. 3 (nat'l. ed.); John-
son, Hospital Backed in AIDS Right-to-Die Case, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1987, at 9, col. 1
(nat'l. ed.) (discussing Evans v. Bellevue Hosp., a July 28, 1987, New York case denying
the petition of the patient's attorney-in-fact for a court order directing the hospital to
discontinue treatment of the patient on the grounds that the patient's non-statutory
living will was ambiguous, and the evidence of the patient's wishes was not "clear and
convincing").
3. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT, 9B U.L.A. 609 (1987) [herein-
after URTIA].
4. The California legislature enacted the nation's first "natural death" or "living
will" act in 1976. See California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1988). For thoughtful analyses of the California law, see
Horan, The "Right to Die" Legislative and Judicial Developments, 13 FORUM 488 (1978)
(discussing the potential negative effects of the California act and criticizing its overly
restrictive provisions); Note, Statutory Recognition of the Right to Die.- The California
Natural Death Act, 57 B.U.L. REV. 148 (1977). See also infra note 26 and accompany-
ing text.
5. Letter from John M. McCabe, Legislative Director, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, to Marguerite Chapman (June 28, 1986) [here-
inafter McCabe Letter] (available through ARK. L. REV.). Mr. McCabe wrote:
The number of introductions in January, 1987, will tell us much about the
potential for the Act. If we get between five and ten, it has real possibilities. If
there are more, obviously we, here, will be delirious. If there are less than five,
progress is likely to be slow.
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it is appropriate to reexamine the work of the Uniform Law
Commissioners (ULC) on this important subject.
Because the URTIA was not generated in a political,
legal, or bioethical vacuum, the overall focus of this article is
on the history, substantive content, and legislative impact of
the Uniform Act. Part II describes the context in which the
URTIA was drafted by the ULC by starting with the Karen
Ann Quinlan case6 and briefly chronicling the judicial and leg-
islative legacy of Quinlan from 1976 through 1985. Part II
also reviews the work of the ULC in the development of laws
regarding dying patients or medical decision-making and
traces the formulation of the URTIA over several years.
Part III specifically examines the URTIA, comparing
and contrasting the Uniform Act with living will laws enacted
by various states between 1976 and August of 1985. Part III
also discusses improvements in the Uniform Act as compared
to many existing laws, and it comments upon the shortcom-
ings of certain state laws incorporated in the URTIA.
Part IV reviews the reaction to the Uniform Act by the
legal and medical communities, as well as by special advocacy
groups. It also assesses the Uniform Act in terms of its influ-
ence upon state legislatures between 1985 and 1988.
Part V discusses the need for uniform legislation address-
ing the rights not only of the terminally ill but also of the
permanently unconscious. Additionally, part V reviews devel-
opments during the past five years which have produced a
consensus among the medical and ethical communities and
the courts on many important issues regarding the care of the
dying. In particular, this section evaluates the likely impact of
the URTIA on the evolution of the legal ability of a dying
patient to control his fateful medical treatment options after
he has lost decision-making capacity.
In sum, this article endeavors not only to describe the
development of URTIA by explaining and evaluating its pro-
visions, but also to assess the influence of this uniform law in
the history of the national movement to secure and enhance
6. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nom., Garger
v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), overruled in part, In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486
A.2d 1209 (1987).
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the rights of patients to refuse life-prolonging treatment. Af-
ter reviewing the shortcomings of the URTIA, the article con-
cludes by calling for the ULC to return to the drafting table
and develop a more comprehensive and useful uniform act ad-
dressing the rights of both the terminally ill and the perma-
nently unconscious.
II. THE LEGACY OF KAREN ANN QUINLAN
A. Background and Impact of In re Quinlan
On April 15, 1975, twenty-one-year-old Karen Ann
Quinlan lapsed into a coma.7 Karen Quinlan never emerged
from that coma, existing for over ten years in a persistent veg-
etative state.8 When Karen Quinlan's parents initially re-
quested, in October of 1975, that her respirator be removed,
the hospital and attending physicians unexpectedly resisted.9
7. Quinlan Dies-Decade in Coma, USA Today, June 12, 1985, at IA, col. 2. For
a detailed account of Karen Ann Quinlan's medical condition and the litigation that it
prompted, see generally J. QUINLAN AND J. QUINLAN with P. BATTELLE, KAREN
ANN: THE QUINLANS TELL THEIR STORY (1977); UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF
AMERICA, IN THE MATTER OF KAREN QUINLAN (1977).
8. Dr. Fred Plum, Professor and Chairman of the Department of Neurology at
Cornell Medical Center-New York Hospital and an internationally renowned authority
on "persistent vegetative state," described a patient in this condition as a " 'subject who
remains with the capacity to maintain the vegetative parts of neurological function but
who.., no longer has any cognitive function.'" Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, -, 355 A.2d 647,
654. More recently, Dr. Plum has further explained that:
Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its
internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat and pul-
monary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activ-
ity of muscle and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there is no
behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings
in a learned manner.
In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, -, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (1987). See also PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION REPORT, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, infira note
46, at 170-75.
9. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT, infra note 46, at 171 n.2. In addition, the local prosecuting
attorney and the Attorney General of New Jersey opposed the efforts of Mr. Quinlan to
be appointed guardian of Karen's person for the express purpose of authorizing the
removal of her respirator. Id.
Four years before the Quinlan case arose, the New Jersey Supreme Court had
equated with suicide a competent patient's refusal of medical treatment. John F. Ken-
nedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, -, 279 A.2d 670, 672 (1971). In Heston,
the mother of a twenty-two-year-old accident victim objected to blood transfusions as
contrary to the patient's religious beliefs. The state supreme court found that though
"religious beliefs are absolute... conduct in pursuance of religious beliefs is not." Id.
1989] URTIA 323
Their resistance led to the litigation that resulted in a
landmark decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
March of 1976, affirming Karen Quinlan's right to die by nat-
ural forces-a right the court viewed as a "valuable incident
of her [constitutional] right of privacy."10
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision set forth pro-
cedures pursuant to which Karen Quinlan's right to forgo
treatment could be exercised by her father in his capacity as
her guardian.' 1 When Karen Quinlan's respirator was later
removed, she was able to breathe on her own and continued to
live in a "twilight" between life and death for nine years,
at 580, 279 A.2d at 672. Support for the view of the state supreme court is found in an
1879 Supreme Court decision which opined in dictum that religious beliefs cannot con-
trol if their practice results in suicide. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879)
(upholding the application of a federal law prohibiting polygamy to a Mormon and
distinguishing the right of government to prohibit certain conduct regardless of its reli-
gious implications from formally prohibiting a belief itself).
For a critical analysis of the effort by the New Jersey Supreme Court to distinguish
Quinlan from Heston, see Chapman, Fateful Treatment Choices for Critically Ill Adults
Part I: The Judicial Model, 37 ARK. L. REV. 908, 926 (1984) (describing such efforts as
a "prelude to a radical theoretical departure").
10. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 664. While acknowledging that the United
States Constitution does not explicitly identify a right of privacy, the New Jersey
Supreme Court relied upon a series of Supreme Court decisions recognizing the exist-
ence of a constitutional right of personal privacy and guaranteeing certain areas of pri-
vacy. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 663 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); and Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). The court in Quinlan also noted the recognition of a
right of privacy in the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 663 (citing N.J.
CONST. Art. I, par. 1). More recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court has opined that
the constitutional basis for the right to die does not encompass cases in which the actual
wishes of the patient are unknown; instead, the state may rely upon its parens patriae
authority to act in these situations. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 364-65, 486 A.2d
1209, 1231 (1985). For additional discussion of a right to die predicated upon constitu-
tional principles, see infra note 17 and accompanying text.
11. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 671-72. Joseph Quinlan, Karen's father,
was appointed the guardian of the person of Karen Quinlan with full power to make
decisions regarding the identity of her treating physicians. However, the court's opin-
ion required Mr. Quinlan and Karen's family to consult with the hospital ethics com-
mittee or like body after attending physicians had made two determinations: (1) that
there was no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever recovering from her comatose condi-
tion to a cognitive, sapient state, and (2) that the life-support apparatus being adminis-
tered to her should be discontinued. The ethics committee, which really functioned
more as a "prognosis committee," had to agree with the physicians' determination.
Only then would the withdrawal of her life-support system be authorized. Id.
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sustained by artificially supplied nutrition and hydration.-2
Paradoxically, Karen Quinlan, although silent and un-
able personally to participate in treatment decisions, personi-
fied perhaps the most difficult moral and legal conundrum of
this century: the treatment and care of the permanently un-
conscious and the terminally ill. Her case provoked a national
reexamination of personal and professional goals and assump-
tions among physicians, other health-care providers, theolo-
gians, and, ultimately, state courts and legislatures.I3
Prior to Quinlan, a patient's right of self-determination,
that is, the right to decide what will or will not be done to
one's body, was legally protected by the doctrine of informed
consent.' 4 Increasingly, courts recognized that the right to re-
fuse treatment is an essential corollary to the right to consent
to treatment. ' 5
12. USA Today, June 12, 1985, at IA, col. 2; A Long Twilight Comes to an End,
NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1985, at 81.
13. See P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGE OF LIFE: MEDICAL & LEGAL INTER-
SECTIONS 268 (1977); Bai, Around the Karen Quinlan Case: Interview with Judge R.
Muir, I INT'L J. MED. 45 (1979); Coburn, In re Quinlan: A Practical Overview, 31 ARK.
L. REV. 59 (1977); Collester, Death, Dying, and the Law: A Prosecutorial View of the
Quinlan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 304 (1977); Hirsch & Donovan, The Right to Die:
Medico-Legal Implications of In re Quinlan, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 267 (1977); Hyland
& Baime, In re Quinlan: A Synthesis ofLaw and Medical Technology, 18 JURIMETRICS
J. 107 (1977).
14. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E.
92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo, J., declaring that "[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body"). For an
exposition of the expansion in the United States of the informed consent doctrine from a
simple concept to an extremely complex body of law, see F. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO
TREATMENT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1984).
15. The right of a patient to refuse medical intervention for a treatable, life-
threatening condition had been litigated in a number of cases prior to Quinlan. See,
e.g., Application of Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center v. Levitt, 73 Misc. 2d
395, 342 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (refusal of amputation); In re Nemser, 51
Misc. 2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (refusal to authorize amputation
of patient's ankle and foot); Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1964) (refusal of surgery). See also F. ROZOVSKY, supra note 14, at 425-26
(discussing In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (C.P. Northhampton Co. Ct. 1973)
where a patient refused to undergo a breast biopsy after physician identified indications
of breast cancer).
Most of the early right-to-refuse-treatment cases involved refusal of blood transfu-
sions by patients who were Jehovah's Witnesses, members of a religious sect whose
followers believe that taking blood in any form is prohibited by Biblical passages such as
Leviticus 17:10 and Acts 15:28-29 and is punished by the loss of heaven. Thus, the
fundamental right of religious belief and the free exercise of that belief were asserted in
324
1989] URTIA 325
. By the time the ULC began work in earnest on the
URTIA in 1983-84, a significant number of state courts in dif-
ferent jurisdictions had concluded that both the common
law 16 and the United States Constitution1 7 protect an individ-
these cases to support the right to refuse treatment. Compare In re Osborne, 294 A.2d
372 (D.C. 1972) (state's interest was insufficient to overcome right of patient with two
young children to decline blood transfusion on religious grounds); In re Estate of
Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (upholding right of competent mother to
refuse blood transfusion on religious grounds); In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390
N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (allowing refusal of blood transfusion by twenty-
three-year-old married female Jehovah's Witness, who suffered a serious uterine hemor-
rhage); Erickson v. Dilgard, 4 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)
(upholding right of competent patient to decline blood transfusion on religious grounds)
with United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965) (court authorized blood
transfusion for competent patient who had objected on religious grounds); Application
of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1964), reh'g en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub nom.,
Jones v. President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964)
(blood transfusion ordered by the court over religious objections voiced by spouse of
patient who was in extremis, non compos mentis, and the mother of an infant child);
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (blood
transfusion ordered by the court for an adult, unmarried woman, whose mother ob-
jected based upon religious beliefs); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center,
49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (patient, who refused blood
based on religious grounds, did not actively resist transfusion once authorized by the
court); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d
537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (blood transfusion ordered to save the life
of the unborn fetus whose mother, a Jehovah's Witness, was beyond her thirty-second
week of pregnancy). Two post-Quinlan cases, involving adult Jehovah's Witnesses re-
sponsible for the support of minor children, have permitted patients to decline medical
treatment. See Woons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987); St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
For a review of the pre-Quinlan cases, see Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment
for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1975); Cantor, A Patient's Decision to
Decline Life Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life,
26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973); Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment & Constitu-
tional Guarantees: A Conflict?, 33 U. PiTr. L. REV. 628 (1972); Note, The Dying Pa-
tient: A Qualified Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 7 J. FAM. L. 644 (1968).
16. Several courts have relied exclusively upon a non-constitutional or common
law right of self-determination or privacy. See, e.g., Lydia E. Hall Hosp. v. Cinque, 116
Misc. 2d 477, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); In re Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184,
423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979), modified, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Storer v. Storer, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
17. See, e.g., Batling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220
(1984) (recognizing a right to refuse treatment based in both the federal and California
constitutions, as well as the law of actionable battery); John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp.,
Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) (expressly recognizing that the constitu-
tional right to refuse treatment extends to incompetent patients); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga.
439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Colyer,
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ual's right to refuse life-prolonging treatment. However, the
courts sometimes differed with regard to which legal approach
should be pursued in cases involving patients who lacked
decision-making capacity. 8 Instances of health-care provid-
ers insisting upon administration of treatment despite prior
99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983), overruled in part, In re Guardianship of Hamlin,
102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (allowing family of incompetent patient to
assert patient's right to die in the absence of appointment of guardian, if other require-
ments of Colyer are met.); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978) (the
continuation on a respirator against the "competent will" of a seventy-three-year-old
patient suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis ". . . invades the patient's constitu-
tional right of privacy, removes his freedom of choice and invades his right to self-
determination"), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Severns v. Wilmington Medical
Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115
(1980); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980);
Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Quackenbush,
156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); Department of Human Serv. v. Northern,
563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 355 A.2d 647
(1976). For a thoughtful analysis of the New Jersey Supreme Court's reliance on the
constitutional right of privacy in Quinlan, see Richards, Constitutional Privacy, the
Right to Die & the Meaning of Life: A Moral Analysis, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327
(1981).
After Quinlan and many of these other decisions were rendered, one commentator
suggested that living will statutes would become "superfluous." Gelfand, Euthanasia
and the Terminally Ill Patient, 63 NEB. L. REv. 741, 750-51 (1984). More recently,
Professor Gelfand reiterated that ". . . Quinlan and its progeny should have rendered
living will statutes irrelevant" while acknowledging that "considerably more than half
the statutes have been enacted in the three years since [his 1984 prediction]." Gelfand,
Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 737, 796 & n.267 [hereinaf-
ter Gelfand, The First Decade].
18. Foody v. Manchester Mem. Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1984) (addressing the role of a substitute decision-maker for a semicomatose
patient and applying a hybrid approach derived from a combination of the "best inter-
ests" and "substituted judgment" standards); John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp., Inc. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) (recognizing a non-statutory living will as a
significant factor in decision-making for an irreversibly comatose patient and authoriz-
ing family members or the legal guardian to make a decision based upon the "substi-
tuted judgment" standard after the patient's attending physician and at least two other
physicians with appropriate specialties had concurred that the patient was in a "perma-
nent vegetative state"); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984) (ruling that
the family or legal guardian of a terminally ill adult or child in a chronic vegetative state
may authorize the termination of treatment without prior court approval and without
review by a hospital committee when the diagnosis and prognosis have been made by
the treating physician and two other physicians have concurred); Severns v. Wilmington
Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (holding that the equitable powers of
the Court of Chancery, after it had conducted a full evidentiary hearing, encompassed
the authority to authorize the court-appointed guardian of a comatose patient to discon-
tinue the use of a respirator and other life-sustaining supports).
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patient objections continued to arise.' 9
In order to enhance the right of individuals to refuse life-
prolonging treatment, many commentators proposed the en-
actment of "living will" or "natural death" statutes.20 The
central thrust of these proposals was the creation of a legal
mechanism which would allow a competent individual to exe-
cute a living will or advance declaration 2' directing that cer-
tain medical procedures or treatments be withheld or
withdrawn in the event the patient was no longer able to make
medical decisions. These proposals also afforded legal protec-
tion to health-care providers by granting immunity from civil
and criminal liability when implementing a patient's
directive.22
19. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985)
(upholding the right of a military hospital patient with decision-making capacity to be
removed from a respirator; the patient's physicians had maintained that U.S. Army
policy precluded the removal of life-sustaining equipment from such patients); Leach v.
Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984) (holding that as a matter of law
the placing of a patient on life-support equipment against the specific wishes of a patient
informed about a known terminal condition, constituted a battery for which the attend-
ing physician and the hospital could be liable in money damages); In re Lydia E. Hall
Hospital, 117 Misc. 2d 1024, 459 N.Y.S.2d 682 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (requiring the
hospital, which had defied the wishes of the patient and his family to forgo treatment, to
pay the entire $1500 fee of the guardian ad litem appointed by the court when the
hospital sought a court order to compel continued treatment); Foster v. Tourtellotte,
No. CV 81-5046-RMT (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16-17, 1981) (granting an injunction requiring
physician's compliance with a patient's withdrawal of consent to the continued use of a
respirator; no final adjudication on the merits due to death of the patient after the order
was stayed pending an appeal).
20. Kutner, Due Process ofEuthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J.
539, 552 (1969); Sharpe & Hargest, Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Patients, 36
FORDHAM L. REV. 695, 702 (1968). See also, Modell, A "Will" to Live, 290 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 907 (1974); Sullivan, The Dying Person-His Plight and His Right, 8 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 197, 215 (1973); Note, The "Living Will": The Right to Death with
Dignity, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 485, 509-26 (1976); Note, Living Wills-Need for
Legal Recognition, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 370, 377 (1976); Comment, Antidysthanasia Con-
tracts: A Proposal for Legalizing Death with Dignity, 5 PAC. L.J. 738, 739-40 (1974);
Note, The Right to Die, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 613, 625 (1974); Note, Informed Consent
and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1663-64 (1974).
21. See, e.g., Kutner, supra note 20, at 552; Note, The "Living Will": The Right to
Death with Dignity?, supra note 20, at 525-26; Note, Living Wills-Needfor Legal Rec-
ognition, supra note 20, at 377.
22. As the Legal Advisors Committee for Concern for Dying has observed, physi-
cians may honor a terminally ill patient's directive declining life-prolonging treatment
in the absence of any statute. Legal Advisors Committee, Concern for Dying, The
Right to Refuse Treatment: A Model Act, 73 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 918, 918 (1983).
Thus, ". . . the current [living will] statutes do not so much enhance patients' rights as
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The Quinlan case profoundly influenced public opinion
and the receptivity of state legislators to natural death legisla-
tion.23 Prior to 1975, "death with dignity" or "living will"
bills had been introduced in about a dozen states.24 During
the state legislative sessions which convened in the spring of
1976 following the lower court's denial of relief in Quinlan,
seventeen right-to-die bills were introduced in different
states.25 In October of 1976, California enacted the nation's
first natural death act.26 During the following year, living will
they enhance provider privileges (Le., physicians typically are granted immunity if they
follow a patient's directive, but are not required to follow it if they do not want to)." Id.
(footnotes omitted). See also Gelfand, The First Decade, supra note 17, at 796-97 &
nn.267, 270 & 274.
23. D. HUMPHRY & A. WICKET-r, THE RIGHT TO DIE-UNDERSTANDING Eu-
THANASIA 114 (1986) [hereinafter HUMPHRY & WICKEI].
24. One commentator has divided the introduction of natural death bills in state
legislatures into three periods: the initial (or very early) stage, the pre-Quinlan phase,
and the post-Quinlan period. Chapman, supra note 9, at 914 n. 14. A bill dealing with
euthanasia of adults of sound mind who have been fatally injured or are "suffer[ing]
extreme physical pain without hope of relief" was introduced in 1906 in the Ohio legis-
lature; it was defeated by a vote of 78 to 22 in the Committee on Medical Jurisprudence.
HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 23, at 12 (citing articles in the Independent, Feb. 1,
1906, and in the Outlook, Feb. 3, 1906, and an editorial in the New York Times, Feb. 3,
1906). In 1912, a woman who was suffering constant pain from an incurable illness
created a sensation when she petitioned the New York state legislature to permit her
doctor to put her to death and grant her physician immunity from criminal homicide.
Id. Over two decades later, in 1937, the Voluntary Euthanasia Act was introduced in
the Nebraska state legislature. NEBRASKA LEG. BILL 135, 52d Sess. (1937). After re-
ferral to committee, however, no action was taken on the bill. HUMPHRY & WICKETT,
supra note 23, at 14. Then in 1947, a petition, signed by 1100 physicians, calling for the
enactment of procedures for the voluntary euthanasia of patients with painful, terminal
illnesses was presented to the New York Legislature. Id. at 34-36. For a description of
the reactions to the New York proposal, see R. RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO DIE 94-97
(1975).
During the more immediate pre-Quinlan phase, Dr. Walter Sackett, a Florida leg-
islator and medical doctor, was one of the strongest advocates of "death-with-dignity"
legislation. HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 23, at 95. Emphasizing the expenses of
artificially prolonging life for patients who are "human vegetables," Dr. Sackett intro-
duced these bills in several sessions of the Florida Legislature during the early 1970s.
Id. During the pre-Quinlan period, right-to-die bills were introduced in at least four-
teen state legislatures: California (1973); Delaware (1973); Florida (1971); Hawaii
(1969); Idaho (1974); Kentucky (1974); Maryland (1974); Massachusetts (1973); Mis-
souri (1974); Montana (1973); Oregon (1973); Washington (1973); West Virginia
(1971); Wisconsin (1971). See id. at 98-99; Chapman, supra note 9, at 914 n.14.
25. HUMPHRY & WICKETr, supra note 23, at 108.
26. California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195
(West Supp. 1988). The narrow scope of the California Act has been confirmed by
empirical research. See Redleaf, The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study
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bills were proposed in forty-two states and enacted by seven."
B. Legislative, Judicial, and Other Developments,
1978-83
1. Action in the State Legislatures
Although they initially generated much response, living
will laws were enacted at a halting pace from 1978 until 1983.
By January of 1984, only seven additional states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia had adopted such laws.28 In addition, com-
mentators suggested a number of "model" statutes, including
the Medical Treatment Decision Act,29 prepared in 1978 by a
of Physicians' Practices, 31 STAN. L. REV. 913 (1979) (indicating that approximately
fifty percent of the patients diagnosed with terminal conditions did not remain con-
scious long enough to become legally qualified to execute binding directives).
27. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF ENACTED LAWS 17 (1981)
[hereinafter SRD HANDBOOK (1981)]. The seven states and their statutes in chrono-
logical order were: New Mexico Right to Die Act (1977) (amended 1984) (N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986)); Texas Natural Death Act (1977) (amended 1985) (TEx.
REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1987)); Arkansas Death with Dignity
Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (1977) (replaced by Arkansas Rights of the
Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to
-218 (Supp. 1987)); North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act (1977) (amended 1983)
(N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1985)); Oregon Rights with Respect to Terminal
Illness Act (1977) (amended 1983) (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to .090 (1983 & Supp.
1987)); Idaho Natural Death Act (1977) (amended 1986) (IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to
-4508 (1985 & Supp. 1988)); Nevada Withholding or Withdrawal of Life Sustaining
Procedures Act (1977) (amended 1985) (NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to .690 (1986)).
28. In chronological order of enactment, the eight jurisdictions that. enacted laws
between 1978 and 1983 were: Washington Natural Death Act (1979) (WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .905 (Supp. 1987)); Kansas Natural Death Act (1979)
(KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1985)); Alabama Natural Death Act
(1981) (ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984)); District of Columbia Natural Death Act
(1981) (D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1987)); Vermont Terminal Care
Document Act (1982) (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (Supp. 1986)); Delaware
Death with Dignity Act (1982) (amended 1983) (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-
2509 (1983)); Virginia Natural Death Act (1983) (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1 to :13
(Repl. 1988)); Illinois Living Will Act (1983) (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2 para. 701-710
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988)).
29. SRD HANDBOOK (1981), supra note 27, at 23-26. The Model Bill was subse-
quently amended to explicitly include a provision for the optional designation of a proxy
empowered to make treatment decisions in the event the declarant lost the capacity to
do so. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 1981-
1984 at 11-12, 36-37 (1984) [hereinafter SRD HANDBOOK FOR 1981-84]. As originally
drafted by the Yale Law School Legislative Services Project, the SRD model bill permit-
ted personalized instructions, which the Society for the Right to Die maintained could
include the appointment of a proxy. Id. at 11. However, the Society concluded that the
explicit provision of an optional proxy designation served "as a further extension of the
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Yale Law School Legislative Services Project under the spon-
sorship of the Society for the Right to Die, and the Right to
Refuse Treatment Model Act,30 published in 1983 by the
Legal Advisors Committee of Concern for Dying.
2. Litigation over the "Feeding" Question and the
Rights of the Permanently Unconscious
Although only two states, Illinois and Virginia, enacted
living will laws in 1983, a number of other important develop-
ments affecting the rights of dying patients occurred that year.
In February of 1983, courts in New Jersey and New Mexico
addressed two important issues involving the rights of termi-
nally ill patients who lacked decision-making capacity. In
New Jersey, the question before the courts was whether naso-
gastric feeding and hydration could be discontinued from
Claire Conroy, a severely mentally impaired and elderly nurs-
patient's right of self-determination." Id. In addition, the Society noted that the inclu-
sion of the optional proxy provision was
[I]n keeping with what appears to be a developing trend toward legislating the
appointment of a surrogate to make health care decisions on behalf of another
person in the event of incompetency. This trend is reflected in the Virginia,
Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, and Wyoming statutes, all of which specifically
provide for proxy appointments, as well as in enacted or proposed amend-
ments to durable power of attorney statutes designed to broaden them to in-
clude medical decisionmaking by an attorney-in-fact.
Id.
30. Legal Advisors Committee, Concern for Dying, supra note 22, at 918, 921.
The Model Right to Refuse Treatment Act prepared by the Legal Advisors Committee
of Concern for Dying endeavored not only to incorporate the best features of various
proposed model statutes, but also to draft language that included provisions necessary
in " 'second generation' legislation." Id. at 918. In the view of this group, "second
generation" natural death legislation should accomplish the following objectives. It
should
(1) not be restricted to the terminally ill, but should apply to all competent
adults and mature minors;
(2) not limit the types of treatment an individual can refuse (e.g., to "ex-
traordinary" treatment) but should apply to all medical intervention;
(3) permit an individual to designate another person to act on his or her
behalf and set forth the criteria under which the designated person is to
make decisions;
(4) require health-care providers to follow the patient's wishes and provide
sanctions for those who do not do so;
(5) require health-care providers to continue to provide palliative care to pa-
tients who refuse other interventions.
Id. at 918-19.
ing home patient who was expected to die within a year.a' In
New Mexico, the issue was whether the court-appointed
guardian of James Robert Smith, a comatose, terminally ill
patient, could authorize the discontinuance of hemodialysis
treatment on behalf of Mr. Smith, who had not executed a
living will under the New Mexico Right to Die Act.32
In New Jersey, a superior couit granted, in February of
1983, the request of Claire Conroy's nephew and court-
appointed guardian to discontinue artificially Supplied suste-
nance. 33  Before being implemented, however, the decision
was stayed, and the case was appealed. 4 Claire Conroy died,
with the nasogastric tube in place, while the appeal was pend-
ing; however, the matter was considered by the appellate
court because of the importance of the issue.35
In July, 1983, the three-judge appellate panel reversed
the lower court's ruling.36 In the opinion of the Superior
Court's Appellate Division, the right to abate treatment was
restricted to irreversibly comatose or brain dead patients; the
right did not extend to patients, like Claire Conroy, whose
decision-making capacity was only severely diminished.37 In
addition, the Appellate Division determined that the with-
drawal of artificially supplied sustenance from a patient in
Claire Conroy's condition would hasten death rather than
merely permit illness to take its natural course.3 8 On appeal,
31. In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 457 A.2d 1232 (Ch. Div. 1983).
32. New Mexico ex rel. Smith v. Fort, No. 14,768 (N.M. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23., 1983).
33. Thomas Whittemore, the nephew and legal guardian of Claire Conroy, was
also her only living relative. He had known her for over fifty years during which time
he had visited her "regularly" at the nursing home, and about once a week for the four
or five year period preceding her commitment to the nursing home. In re Conroy, 98
N.J. 321, -, 486 A.2d 1219, 1218 (1985). The record included evidence of the financial
situations of both Thomas Whittemore and Claire Conroy. Id. Based on such informa-
tion, the court concluded that "there was no question that the nephew had good inten-
tions and had no real conflict of interest due to possible inheritance when he sought
permission to remove the tube." Id.
34. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super, 453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983).
35. Id. The Appellate Division observed that although cases like Claire Conroy's
were capable of repetition, they were likely to evade review due to frequent patient
deaths while litigation was pending. Id.
36. Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. at -, 464 A.2d at 316.
37. Id. at 473, 464 A.2d at 303.
38. Id. at 473, 464 A.2d at 303-04.
1989] 331URTIA
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.3 9
In New Mexico ex rel Smith v. Fort,' the New Mexico
Supreme Court, in February of 1983, reversed the lower
court's ruling that had granted the request of the legal guard-
ian of James Robert Smith to authorize the discontinuance of
hemodialysis for Smith's kidney-related ailments. Although
Mr. Smith had not executed written instructions in accord-
ance with the Right to Die Act, his family, doctors, and the
court-appointed religious visitor unanimously agreed that he
would opt to forgo continued hemodialysis if he had decision-
making capacity.4 1 Moreover, his doctors agreed that no
treatment could save his life or substantially benefit his
health.42 Nevertheless, the supreme court held that the state
lacked statutory authority to empower a legal guardian to au-
thorize the abatement of life-prolonging treatment on behalf
of an incompetent patient.43
Later in 1983, the state legislature of New Mexico passed
a bill amending the New Mexico Right to Die Act. The
amendment established guidelines for the abatement of life-
sustaining treatment in cases of irreversibly comatose patients
who had not executed living wills." The 1983 bill was vetoed
by the governor; however, during the next legislative session it
was reintroduced, passed, and ultimately signed into law.45
3. The Report of the President's Commission on
"Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment"
In March of 1983, the President's Commission for the
39. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,.486 A.2d 1209 (1985). The New Jersey Supreme
Court granted the guardian's petition for certification, despite the death of the patient,
because it concurred with the Appellate Division's assessment of the importance of the
issues presented. Id. at -, 486 A.2d at 1219. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying
text (detailing the reversal decision).
40. No. 14,768 (N.M. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 1983).
41. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, RIGHT-TO-DIE COURT DECISIONS NM-l
(1986) [hereinafter SRD COURT DECISIONS (1986)].
42. Id.
43. New Mexico ex rel. Smith v. Fort, summarized in SRD COURT DECISIONS
(1986), id. An amicus curiae brief was submitted on behalf of the Ethics Committee of
St. Joseph Hospital, the New Mexico Medical Society, and the New Mexico Hospital
Association. Id.
44. Id. at NM-I, NM-2. According to the Society for the Right to Die, the New
Mexico legislature's response was immediate. Id.
45. Id. See also infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research completed its Report on Deciding to
Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment.46 Although not part of its
original mandate, the Commission decided to address this is-
sue because it was closely related to mandated subjects and
"seemed... to involve some of the most important and troub-
ling ethical and legal questions in modem medicine.""
Among other topics discussed in this Report, the President's
Commission evaluated the natural death acts of the fifteen ju-
risdictions which had adopted such legislation. Other
decision-making mechanisms, particularly the use of proxy di-
rectives utilized pursuant to state durable power-of-attorney
statutes,48 were also addressed.
The President's Commission recognized that both living
wills and proxy directives "are important for medical deci-
sionmaking that respects patients' wishes." However, it also
observed that "[p]roxy directives allow patients to control
decisionmaking in a far broader range of cases than the in-
struction directives authorized by most existing natural death
acts."' 49 Furthermore, the Commission suggested the need for
additional study of existing durable power-of-attorney statutes
and the possible need to require greater procedural safeguards
when applying these statutes to health-care decision-making
for incapacitated patients.5 0
The Commission's Report outlined four general
considerations, including the use of a proxy arrangement, in
46. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, & LEGAL
ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION RE-
PORT, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT].
47. Letter from Morris B. Abram, Chairman, President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, to the
President of the United States (Mar. 21, 1983), reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
REPORT, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 46.
48. Id. at 136-47. In the opinion of the President's Commission, "[the greatest
value of the natural death acts is the impetus they provide for discussions between pa-
tients and practitioners about decisions to forego life-sustaining treatment." Id. at 145
(footnote omitted). However, the President's Commission also observed that "[t]his
educational effort might be obtained ... without making the documents binding by
statute and without enforcement and punishment provisions." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 147.
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formulating or amending legislation authorizing advance di-
rectives.5 1 The Report was one of the most important re-
sources available to the ULC in 1983 when they began their
work on the URTIA.
4. The Attempted Prosecution of Two California
Doctors for Discontinuing Artificial Sustenance
Concern by physicians about their potential legal liability
for withdrawing artificial sustenance treatment was height-
ened in May of 1983 when the California Superior Court rein-
stated criminal charges against Dr. Neil Barber and Dr.
Robert Nejdl 5 2 The doctors had been charged in 1982 with
murder and conspiracy to commit murder for ordering the
withdrawal of the respirator and intravenous tubes which pro-
vided hydration and nutrition to Clarence Herbert,5" a se-
verely brain-damaged cancer patient. Herbert, who had
suffered cardiac arrest in the recovery room following surgery,
had not executed a directive to physicians and, therefore, did
not fall within the scope of the California Natural Death
Act."4
The doctors had first taken Herbert off the respirator
with the authorization of his family.55 Two days later, after
further consultation with the family, the doctors also removed
intravenous sustenance. 6 The patient died six days later.
51. Id. at 149-53. The President's Commission recommendation focused on four
areas: (1) requirements for a valid directive; (2) legal effect of directives; (3) characteris-
tics and authority of a proxy health-care decision-maker; and (4) administrative aspects.
Id.
52. People v. Neil Leonard Barber and Robert Joseph Nejdl, No. A025586, (Los
Angeles County Super. Ct., May 5, 1983) (tentative decision).
53. Towers, Irreversible Coma and Withdrawal of Life Support: Is It Murder if the
IV Line Is Disconnected?, 8 J. MED. ETHIcs 203, 203 (1982). The patient had died in
August, 1981 in a hospital owned by the Kaiser-Permanente System, the nation's largest
prepaid health-care system of health maintenance organization (HMO). Id. at 203-04.
The prosecutors contended that the two doctors' conduct was motivated in part by a
desire "to save money for a prepaid health plan." HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note
23, at 252.
54. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
55. Towers, supra note 53, at 203. Although the patient was severely brain-
damaged, his brain-stem function was sufficiently intact for spontaneous breathing to
occur after the respirator was removed. Id.
56. Id. Although press accounts differed on this point, the family of the patient
apparently demanded that all life-support systems be stopped, including artificially sup-
plied nourishment and hydration. After the doctors discontinued artificial hydration
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Initially, a municipal court had dismissed the criminal
charges, ruling that Dr. Barber and Dr: Nejdl had acted prop-
erly, exercising their best medical judgment. 57 After the Supe-
rior Court reinstated the charges in May of 1983, the case was
elevated to the California Court of Appeal.58 The medical
community anxiously awaited the decision of whether or not
the doctors would have to stand trial.5 9 Then, in October of
1983, the Court of Appeal's three-judge panel ruled in favor of
the doctors and ordered the charges dismissed.6o
The California Court of Appeal held that life-sustaining
procedures may be discontinued under circumstances other
and sustenance and ordered only "ordinary" nursing care, spontaneous breathing con-
tinued for a week. The autopsy findings listed "dehydration" as a factor contributing to
the patient's death. Id. Sandra Bardenilla, an intensive care nursing supervisor at the
hospital, objected to the management of the patient, particularly the orders not to mist
his endotracheal tube and, later, the orders to discontinue artificial hydration and nour-
ishment. Gianelli, Nurse Who Challenged MDs' Action Wins Case, Am. Med. News,
Sept. 9, 1988, at 10, col. 1. After discussing the management of the patient with her
supervisor, the director of nursing, the director of personnel, and the chief of staff,
Nurse Bardenilla reported the case to the Department of Health Services when the pa-
tient died. In bringing the murder charges against the two doctors, prosecutors in the
office of the Los Angeles District Attorney contended that the two doctors had pres-
sured the patient's wife to agree to withdraw life support to cover up hospital malprac-
tice. Id. See also HUMPHRY & WICKETr, supra note 23, at 252. The prosecutors
maintained that the patient's brain damage was caused by lack of adequate oxygen sup-
ply following anesthesia, which would have been managed properly but for an under-
staffing problem in the recovery room. Gianelli, supra, at 11. In their defense, the two
doctors asserted that they were implementing the wishes of the family of an irreversibly
comatose patient. HUMPHRY & WICKETr, supra note 23, at 252.
57. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
486 (1983).
58. Id.
59. SRD HANDBOOK FOR 1981-84, supra note 29, at 8.
60. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). Although criminal
charges were dropped, questions of civil liability for negligence remained. Gianelli,
supra note 56, at 11, col. 1. In March of 1988, a three-member Los Angeles Superior
County arbitration panel unanimously agreed the recovery room understaffing consti-
tuted negligence. The arbitration panel ordered Kaiser Foundation Hospital to pay
$325,000 to the family of Clarence Herbert. However, with regard to the doctors' deci-
sion to remove all life support systems, the arbitration panel ruled two to one in favor
the doctors. Id.
More recently, on August 24, 1988, Sandra Bardenilla, the nursing supervisor who
objected to Mr. Herbert's care, won a trial court verdict of $114,000 against Kaiser
Foundation Hospital officials, including damages for lost earnings, emotional damages,
and punitive damages. The jury found that Kaiser had treated Bardenilla maliciously
and oppressively. Id. at 10, col. 1.
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than those specified in the California Natural Death Act.6"
Mrs. Herbert, the patient's wife, was an appropriate surrogate
decision-maker in his case, and the official appointment of a
guardian was not necessary under these circumstances.62
More importantly, the court held that artificially supplied nu-
trition and hydration are indistinguishable from the use of a
respirator or other artificial life support.6 a Finally, the court
concluded that a physician is under no duty to continue artifi-
cial life support treatment when there is no hope that the pa-
tient will recover. 64
5. American Hospital Association Survey of
Public Attitudes Toward the Abatement
of Life-Sustaining Treatment
Public support for the abatement of life-prolonging treat-
ment of terminally ill patients was gauged by the American
Hospital Association (AHA) in a 1983 survey of 1800 adults
in all age groups. 65 The AHA survey indicated that approxi-
mately three of every four Americans thought that physicians
should discontinue life-support systems of patients for whom
there was little or no hope of recovery to a normal life. In
addition, two of three survey respondents thought that fami-
lies should act as surrogate decision-makers for patients who
lacked capacity.66 Finally, fifty percent of those queried by
61. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
62. Id. at 1021-22, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
63. Id. at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. The withdrawal of artificially supplied
nourishment and hydration from patient Clarence Herbert has been the subject of ex-
tensive commentary in both the medical and legal communities. See, e.g., Annas, Fash-
ion and Freedom: When Artificial Feeding Should Be Withdrawn, 75 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 685 (1985) [hereinafter Annas, Fashion and Freedom]; Dresser & Boisaubin,
Ethics, Law, and Nutritional Support, 145 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 122 (1985);
Cranford, Termination of Treatment in the Persistent Vegetative State, 4 SEMINARS IN
NEUROLOGY 36 (1984); Meilaender, On Removing Food and Water: Against the
Stream, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 11 (December, 1984); Steinbock, The Removal of
Mr. Herbert's Feeding Tube, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13 (October, 1983).
64. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
65. SRD HANDBOOK FOR 1981-84, supra note 29, at 7.
66. Id. While seventy-one percent of the respondents supported the termination of
life support systems, the survey revealed that younger adults were more likely than
older adults to prefer continued administration of life-sustaining procedures. HUM-




the AHA opposed decision-making by a committee of
physicians and clergy.67
C. Important Developments, 1984-85
1. The Emergence of Consensus Among
Ten Prominent Physicians
While work by the ULC was progressing on a uniform
natural death act, ten distinguished physicians with diverse
professional and institutional backgrounds co-authored guide-
lines on "The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly
Ill Patients." These guidelines were published in April of
1984 in the New England Journal of Medicine.6" Due to the
prestige of both the writers and their forum, the article re-
ceived national attention.69
The article delineated medical treatment which the doc-
tors considered ethical and appropriate in various medical sit-
uations, ranging from emergency resuscitation and intensive
care to utilization of only comfort care.70 The comprehensive
guidelines included those for patients who lacked capacity to
make health-care decisions, as well as for those who retained
67. SRD HANDBOOK FOR 1981-84, supra note 29, at 7.
68. Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford, Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taus-
sig, & van Eys, The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 955 (1984) [hereinafter Wanzer & Adelstein, The Physician's
Responsibility].
69. See, e.g., SRD HANDBOOK FOR 1981-84, supra note 29, at 4. Preparation of
the article by the ten physicians was part of a project sponsored by the Society for the
Right to Die. The doctors had assembled at an SRD conference to formulate guidelines
on medically and ethically appropriate care for patients in various stages of irreversible
and incurable illness. Ultimately, the Society for the Right to Die republished the arti-
cle in its entirety, along with other information, in a handbook. See SOCIETY FOR' THE
RIGHT TO DIE, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE HOPELESSLY ILL PATIENT: LEGAL, MEDI-
CAL & ETHICAL GUIDELINES 4 (1985).
70. Wanzer & Adelstein, The Physician's Responsibility, supra note 68, at 956-58.
The authors described four general levels of care:
(1) emergency resuscitation;
(2) intensive care and advanced life support;
(3) general medical care, including antibiotics, drugs, surgery, cancer chem-
otherapy' and artificial hydration and nutrition; and
(4) general nursing care and efforts to make the patient comfortable, includ-
ing pain relief and hydration and nutrition as dictated by the patient's thirst
and hunger.
Id. at 958.
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such capability. 71 The doctors placed primary emphasis upon
the decision-making role of the patient or the surrogate
decision-maker? 2 The article also recognized the value of a
living will or proxy appointment.73
2. Legislative Activities in 1984
Seven additional states enacted natural death bills in
1984. Among these states was Florida, where Dr. Walter
Sackett had first introduced a living will bill in 1968.74 Addi-
tionally, New Mexico amended its Right to Die Act in 1984
by adding "irreversible coma" as an alternative condition
qualifying a patient for the removal of maintenance medical
treatment. 75 The New Mexico amendment created a proce-
dure for obtaining substituted consent for the removal of
maintenance treatment from an incompetent, terminally ill, or
irreversibly comatose patient who had not executed a living
will. The procedure allowed the abatement of treatment
"'when all family members who can be contacted through rea-
sonable diligence agree in good faith that the patient, if com-
petent, would choose to forgo that treatment. 76
71. Id. at 958-59. In discussing "the incompetent patient," the ten co-authors
distinguished among brain dead patients, patients in persistent vegetative states, se-
verely and irreversibly demented patients, and elderly patients whose competence is
mildly but permanently impaired. Id.
72. Id. at 955-56. The article also described the role of the physician in the
decision-making process: "He or she has the knowledge, skills, and judgment to pro-
vide diagnosis and prognosis, to offer treatment choices and explain their implications,
and to assume responsibility for recommending a decision with respect to treatment."
Id. at 956.
73. Id.
74. In chronological order of adoption, the state statutes enacted were: Wyoming
Act (1984) (WVo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (Supp. 1988)); West Virginia Natural
Death Act (1984) (W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (Supp. 1988)); Georgia Living Wills
Act (1984) (amended 1987) (GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1988));
Mississippi Withdrawal of Life-Saving Mechanisms Act (1984) (Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1988)); Wisconsin Natural Death Act (1984) (amended
1986) (Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West Supp. 1988)); Florida Life-Prolonging
Procedure Act (1984) (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 (West Supp. 1986)); Louisiana
Life-Sustaining Procedures Act (1984) (amended 1985) (LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1988)). Dr. Sackett's efforts are described at supra
note 24.
75. Amendments to New Mexico Right to Die Act, S. Bill 15, Ratified in 1984
Session, codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986).
76. Id. at § 24-7-8.1. The statute defines "family members" as the spouse and
children over the age of eighteen; if none, the term refers to the parents of the incompe-
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3. The New Jersey Supreme Court's Decision in Conroy
The year 1985 was an important benchmark in the evolu-
tion of the rights of patients wishing to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment. As the new year dawned, Karen Quinlan
was still alive in a persistent vegetative condition, sustained by
artificially supplied nourishment in a nursing home." The
dramatic impact of her case upon the rights of permanently
comatose and terminally ill patients continued to grow.
On January 17, 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court ad-
ded its decision in In re Conroy78 to the judicial legacy of
Quinlan. Whereas Quinlan had only addressed the removal of
the respirator, Conroy set forth circumstances and procedures
for withdrawing or withholding other life-sustaining treat-
ment-particularly nasogastric feeding-from elderly, incom-
petent, nursing home patients for whom death was expected
within a year even if treatment continued. 79 The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division which had
tent patient; and if neither parent is alive, the term means the adult siblings of the
incompetent patient. Id. at § 24-7-2.A. "Irreversible coma" is defined as a condition in
which brain-stem functions remain but the major components of the cerebrum are irre-
versibly destroyed. Id. at § 24-7-2.B.
77. Esper, To Be or Not to Be: Karen Quinlan and "Death with Dignity" Issue
Live, Tulsa World, Jan. 6, 1985, at 14A, col. 1 (AP story). Karen Quinlan had been
weaned from the respirator in May of 1976 after the New Jersey Supreme Court unani-
mously overruled the lower court which had denied her family's request to disconnect
her from the machine. Because Karen's parents morally objected to the withdrawal of
nourishment and antibiotics, Karen continued to receive artificially supplied nutrition
and hydration and antibiotics as needed from April 15, 1975, when she lapsed into the
coma, until her death over a decade later on June 11, 1985. See J. QUINLAN & J.
QUINLAN with P. BATTELLE, supra note 7, at 282 (describing the moral problems of the
Quinlans with regard to withdrawal of sustenance and antibiotics).
78. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
79. Id. at -, 486 A.2d at 1231, 1237-44. The supreme court said that the
decision-making procedure for permanently comatose, hospitalized patients set forth in
Quinlan was inappropriate for nursing home residents due to significant differences in
the populations, professional staffing patterns, and institutional structures between nurs-
ing homes and hospitals. Id. at -, 486 A.2d at 1237. The decision-making process
delineated by the supreme court for this particular category of nursing home patients
included assessment of the patient's capacity to make medical decisions; determination
of a suitable person to represent the patient as guardian with respect to medical deci-
sions; justification of treatment abatement under one of three tests (the subjective, the
limited-objective, or the pure-objective standard); notice to the Office of the
Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly of a proposed treatment abatement action;
investigation and reporting by the Ombudsman to the Commissioner of Human Serv-
ices; and confirmation of the patient's medical condition and prognosis by two physi-
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ruled in 1983 that withdrawal of Claire Conroy's nasogastric
tube would be tantamount to killing her-not simply letting
her die-and that such active euthanasia was ethically
impermissible.80
In Conroy the New Jersey Supreme Court also rejected
"any distinction between withholding and withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment"" and criticized the utility of prior ef-
forts to distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary treat-
ment. 2 Most significantly, the supreme court made no
distinction between the termination of artificial feedings and
the termination of other forms of life support.8 3 The decision
cians affiliated with neither the nursing home nor the attending physician and appointed
by the Ombudsman or the courts. Id. at -, 486 A.2d at 1242.
On August 30, 1988, the New Jersey Ombudsman's Office for the Institutionalized
Elderly issued a directive outlining how the office would implement the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decisions in Conroy and other cases. See Gianelli, Medical Ethics De-
bate.- "Right to Die" vs. "Right to Kill"?, Am. Med. News, Jan. 6, 1989, at 4, col. 4.
The directive said that any decision to withdraw or withhold life-prolonging treatment
from an elderly patient lacking capacity to make such decisions would be investigated as
"a possible case of patient abuse." Id. at 5, col. 1 (quoting the directive). Although the
stated purpose of safeguards established by the ombudsman's office was "to protect the
vulnerable elderly who may be the victims of malicious or uncaring relatives or
caregivers," many physicians were upset by the approach taken in the directive. Id.
80. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 475, 464 A.2d 303, 315 (1983).
81. Conroy, 98 N.J. at -, 486 A.2d at 1234. Some had maintained that stopping
life-sustaining treatment after it had been initiated was morally more problematic than
failing to begin the treatment. See, e.g., Clouter, Allowing or Causing: Another Look, 87
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 622, 624 (1977). The New Jersey Supreme Court said that
"[tihis distinction is more psychologically compelling than logically sound." Conroy, 98
N.J. at -, 486 A.2d at 1234. Moreover, the supreme court noted that a rule forbidding
physicians from discontinuing treatment under circumstances in which the treatment
could permissibly be withheld "could discourage families and doctors from even at-
tempting certain types of care and could thereby force them into hasty and premature
decisions to allow a patient to die." Id. (citing Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always
Be Given Food and Water?, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP., 17, 19-20 (October 1983)).
82. Conroy, 98 N.J. at -, 486 A.2d at 1235 (concluding that "[t]he terms 'ordi-
nary' and 'extraordinary' have assumed too many conflicting meanings to remain
useful").
83. Id. at -, 486 A.2d at 1236-37. The supreme court observed:
Once one enters the realm of complex, high-technology medical care, it is
hard to shed the "emotional symbolism" of food.... However, artificial feed-
ings such as nasogastric tubes, gastrostomies, and intravenous infusions are
significantly different from bottle-feeding or spoon-feeding-they are medical
procedures with inherent risks and possible side effects, instituted by 'skilled
health care providers to compensate for impaired physical functioning. Ana-
lytically, artificial feeding by means of a nasogastric tube or intravenous infu-
sion can be seen as equivalent to artificial breathing by means of a respirator.
may be one of the most far reaching rendered by a state high
court in the right-to-die area.
4. Reaction of Special Advocacy Groups to Conroy
.The most controversial aspect of the Conroy decision was
the inclusion of artificially Supplied nutrition and hydration in
the category of life-sustaining treatment which may be de-
clined by a patient or surrogate decision-maker. 84 Conse-
quently, as states experienced a resurgence in the introduction
of proposed living will laws with the beginning of new legisla-
tive sessions in January of 1985, Conroy galvanized right-to-
life activists to seek legislative amendments prohibiting or se-
verely restricting the withholding or withdrawal of food and
water from incompetent patients.8 5
The Committee for Pro-Life Activities of the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops approved guidelines on provi-
sions which church officials were to seek inclusion of in any
proposed state living will legislation. 86  One guideline sug-
gested that right-to-die bills should specifically exclude the
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from the definition of
life-sustaining procedures. Such an exclusion would mean
that these measures could not be withheld from a terminally
ill, incompetent patient-even if the patient had previously ex-
ecuted a living will.8 7
5. Legislative Activities in 1985
As the ULC was completing the draft of a uniform living
Both prolong life through mechanical means when the body is no longer able
to perform a vital bodily function on its own.
Id. at -, 486 A.2d at 1236 (citing Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006,
1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (1983)).
84. For incisive discussions of the ethical, medical, and legal considerations in-
volved in withholding artificial sustenance, see Annas, Fashion and Freedom, supra note
63, at 686-87 and Dresser & Boisaubin, supra note 63, at 123-24.
85. Otten, New "Wills" Allow People to Reject Prolonging of Life in Fatal Illness,
Wall St. J., July 2, 1985, at 23, col. 4 [hereinafter Otten, New Wills]. For a description
of the membership and role of right-to-life groups that opposed living will legislation,
see Otten, "Living Will" Bills Fought in States, Wall St. J., May 3, 1984, at 52, col. 1.
Many of these groups characterized living will legislation as "an opening wedge of the
euthanasia movement" and as "advancing 'the concept of euthanasia (mercy killing)
and rational suicide.'" Id.
86. Otten, New Wills, supra note 85.
87. Id.
1989] URTIA 341
342 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:319
will law, the first half of 1985 witnessed the enactment of state
living will statutes in legislative chambers across the nation at
a pace unprecedented in the history of American natural
death legislation. The acceleration of legislative activity dur-
ing 1985 resulted in the adoption of natural death laws by
thirteen states during the four-month period between March 4
and July 1, 1985.88 The right-to-life activists apparently en-
joyed a lot of influence because, contrary to Conroy, many of
the 1985 laws expressly excluded artificially supplied nutrition
and hydration from the life-sustaining procedures which
could be declined pursuant to a treatment directive.89 In sum,
88. In chronological order of enactment, these statutes included: Iowa Life-
Sustaining Procedures Act (1985) (amended 1987) (IowA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to.11
(West Supp. 1988), amended H.F. 360, 1987 sess., 72nd Iowa General Assembly); Utah
Personal Choice and Living Will Act (1985) (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118
(Supp. 1988)); Montana Living Will Act (1985) (MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to
-104, -111, -201 to -206 (1987)); Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures
Act (1985) (IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -17 (Burns Supp. 1988)); Arizona Medi-
cal Treatment Decision Act (1985) (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210
(1986)); Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act (1985) (TENN. CODE ANN. §§
32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1988)); Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act (1985)
(COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Repl. 1987)); Oklahoma Natural Death Act
(1985) (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1989)); Maine Living
Wills Act (1985) (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (Supp. 1988)); New
Hampshire Terminal Care Document Act (1985) (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 -
:16 (Supp. 1988)); Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act (1985) (amended 1986)
(MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1988)); Missouri Life Support
Declarations Act (1985) (Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1988));
Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act (1985) (CONN. GEN. STAT. §§
19a-570 to -575 (Supp. 1988)).
89. The statutes of Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, and Missouri explicitly provide
that artificial nutrition and hydration are not life-sustaining procedures which may be
rejected under each state's living will law. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-103(7) (Repl.
1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571(l) (Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 2921(4) (Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989). Language
clearly prohibiting the abatement of artificial nourishment is also found in the statutes
of Georgia and Wisconsin, both adopted in 1984, and in Idaho's recently amended law.
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5) (Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE § 39-4503(4) (1985 & Supp.
1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5)(b) (West 1988). The legislation enacted in Ari-
zona, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and Utah exclude artifi-
cially administered nourishment from life-sustaining procedures that may be withheld
or withdrawn. These statutes also exclude from the category the administration of
medication and the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide
comfort care. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(4) (1986); IND. CODE ANN. §
16-8-11-4 (Burns Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.2(5)(b) (West Supp. 1988);
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605(1) (Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 137H:2(2) (Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102(4) (West Supp. 1989);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1103(6)(b) (Supp. 1988). Similar provisions associating artifi-
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thirty-five states and the District of Columbia9 ° had living will
laws, many varying significantly in scope, when the ULC con-
vened in August of 1985 to give final consideration and ap-
proval to the URTIA.
D. The Drafting by the ULC of the URTIA
and Related Laws
1. The Development of Uniform Laws Relative to
Dying Patients and Medical Decision-Making
For over two decades, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws has produced laws to ad-
cial sustenance with comfort care measures, which may not be withheld, are found in
four state statutes enacted in 1983 or 1984. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(3) (West Supp.
1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 702(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); W. VA.
CODE § 16-30-02(3) (Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 33-26-144(iii) (Supp. 1988). If the
language "deemed necessary to provide comfort care" is interpreted to modify artifi-
cially supplied nutrition and hydration, as well as other medical procedures, a declarant
should have the right to refuse artificial nourishment and hydration unnecessary to his
or her comfort.
Two states which enacted living will legislation in 1986- after the Uniform Act
was approved by the ULC-also associate artificial nutrition and hydration with com-
fort care measures that cannot be abated. See infra note 255 and accompanying text
(discussing the statutes of Hawaii and South Carolina).
90. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to
-3210 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Supp. 1987); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to
-113 (Repl. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (Supp. 1988); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2422 to -2430 (Supp.
1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1
to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985 & Supp. 1986);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101A, para. 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 -.10 (West Supp.
1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:1299.58.1 -. 10 (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2929-2931
(Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1988); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 -.055
(Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -104, -111, -201 to -206
(1987); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 -.690 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1
to :16 (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 90-320 to -323 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1989);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 -.090 (1983 & Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101
to -110 (Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1989);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 5251-5262 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1-:13 (Repl. 1988); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10
(Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. §§ 154.01-.15 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. §§ 33-26-144
to -152 (Supp. 1988).
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
dress specific problems relating to dying patients and medical
decision-making. The problems addressed by these uniform
and model laws have included the donation of organs removed
from cadavers, the recognition of the concept of "whole
brain" death, and the concept of consent to health care.
a. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
In 1968 the ULC approved the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act (UAGA),91 thereby creating a legal mechanism to facili-
tate the donation of organs of deceased patients for transplan-
tation purposes. The UAGA was adopted by all fifty states
and the District of Columbia by 1971 and has been one of the
most well-received uniform acts in the ninety-seven year his-
tory of the Uniform Law Conference. 92
b. Development of a "Whole Brain" Death Law
In 1978, a decade after the approval of the UAGA, the
ULC completed work on the Uniform Brain Death Act. 9a
However, even after this Act was submitted to the states for
consideration, several states continued to implement their
own somewhat idiosyncratic approaches in enacting brain
death laws.9 4 Because of the problems created by the varia-
tions in these laws, another effort was undertaken to draft a
uniform act more broadly acceptable to the states.
In May of 1980, the Executive Director of the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
91. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8 U.L.A. 15 (1983).
92. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
93. UNIF. BRAIN DEATH ACT, (act superseded 1983 by Unif. Determination of
Death Act) reprinted in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFER-
ENCE MEETING IN ITS EIGHTY-SEVENTH YEAR 145 (1978) [hereinafter 1978
HANDBOOK]. The act was approved by the ULC on August 3, 1978, by a vote of forty-
seven to one. Id. at 75-77. The Prefatory Note to the Act stressed its narrowness and
noted subjects not addressed by it, including "living wills, death with dignity, euthana-
sia, rules on death certificates, maintaining life support beyond brain death in case of
pregnant women or of organ donors, and protection accorded the dead body." Prefa-
tory Note, UNIF. BRAIN DEATH ACT, reprinted in id. at 144.
94. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH 67 (1981)
[hereinafter, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, DEFINING DEATH]. Examples of
idiosyncratic legislative approaches include the Arkansas, Connecticut, and Wyoming
statutes enacted in 1979 and the Florida statute enacted in 1980. Id.
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and Biomedical and Behavioral Research met with
representatives of the American Bar Association (ABA), the
American Medical Association (AMA), and the ULC to draft
a better brain death proposal.95 The combined efforts of these
organizations ultimately produced the Uniform Determina-
tion of Death Act,96 which was approved by the ULC in 1980.
The 1980 Act, which superseded the Uniform Brain Death
Act, has been much more widely accepted.
c. The Model Health Care Consent Act
In 1982, two years after the Uniform Determination of
Death Act was approved, the ULC completed work on yet
another law involving health-care decisions, -the Model Health
Care Consent Act.97 It establishes a mechanism for the ap-
pointment of a health-care representative to make medical
treatment decisions on behalf of a patient lacking decisional
capacity. 98 The title of the Model Health Care Consent Act is
very misleading. Although the title suggests that consent is its
central focus, the model Act should more accurately be la-
beled a "substitute authority to decide" act.99 As a result, the
95. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, DEFINING DEATH, supra note 94, at 73.
Efforts to draft a "model" statute were inspired in large measure by a model statute
proposed in 1972 by Professor Alexander Morgan Capron and Dr. Leon R. Kass. Id. at
63 (describing the "Capron-Kass Proposal"). For. the original exposition of the Capron-
Kass proposal, see Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Deter-
mining Human Death: An Appraisal & a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87, 111 (1972).
For an elaboration of the proposal, see Capron, Legal Definition of Death, 315 ANN.
N.Y. ACAD. Sca. 349, 356 (1978).
96. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, 12 U.L.A. 236 (1983) [hereinafter
UDDA]. The UDDA was approved in 1980 by the ULC, the AMA, and the Presi-
dent's Commission, and in 1981 by the ABA, to supersede the Uniform Brain Death
Act and other earlier proposals. Appendix C, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, DE-
FINING DEATH, supra note 94, at 119. By June of 1988, the UDDA had been adopted
by statute or judicial decision in twenty-five states and the District of Columbia. J.
AREEN, P. KING, S. GOLDBERG, & A CAPRON, LAW, SCIENCE & MEDICINE 281
(Supp. 1989).
97. MODEL HEALTH CARE CONSENT ACT, 9 U.L.A. 453 (1988). The Model
Health Care Consent Act was formally approved on August 5, 1982, by a vote of forty-
two to five. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING
IN ITS NINETY-FIRST YEAR 57, 58-9 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 HANDBOOK].
98. MODEL HEALTH-CARE CONSENT ACT supra note 97, at § 4. For a discussion
of these provisions, see LeBlang, Uniform Law Commissioners'Model Health-Care Con-
sent Act-An Overview, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 479, 486-88 (1983).
99. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUS-
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model Act has been criticized for its narrow scope and impre-
cision.c°° The states thus far have shown very little enthusi-
asm for this model Act. 101
d. The Need for a Uniform "Natural Death" Act
As more and more states followed the lead of California
in enacting state living will or natural death acts, the ULC
became concerned with the tremendous variation in state
laws. In addition, the increasing mobility of American citi-
zens presented the possibility that a person who had signed a
living will or declaration declining life-sustaining actions in
one state might be critically injured or become seriously ill in
another state which was unwilling to honor the declaration.
As the President's Commission had observed with regard to
the great variation in state brain death laws: "In most areas of
the law, provisions that diverge from one state to the next cre-
ate, at worst, inconvenience and the occasional failure of a
finely honed business or personal plan to achieve its intended
result. But on the subject of death, nonuniformity has a jar-
ring effect."' 020ne commentator remarked in a 1982 article' 03
that the same considerations which led to the formulation of
the Uniform Determination of Death Act similarly compelled
the drafting of a uniform natural death act." Because the
technology employed to extend life is fairly uniform through-
out the United States, the author recommended a uniform act
which would incorporate the best features of the existing state
TAINING TREATMENT, supra note 46, at 147-48. See also Capron, Uniform Law Com-
missioners' Model Health-Care Consent Act-Considerations Against Adoption, 4 J.
LEGAL MED. 513, 514 (1983).
100. See Capron, supra note 99, at 514-24. See also Annas & Glantz, infra note
237, at 145. For a favorable assessment of the model act, see Pickle, Uniform Law
Commissioners' Model Health-Care Consent Act-Considerations in Favor of Adoption, 4
J. LEGAL MED. 501 (1983).
The ULC's Prefatory Note to the model act indicates that it is "procedural in
nature and purposefully narrow in scope" and that "[ilts primary aim is to provide
authorization to consent to health care." See Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 453 (1988).
101. Apparently only one state, Indiana, has adopted the model act. See 9 UL.A.
453.
102. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, DEFINING DEATH, supra note 94, at 72.
103. Freamon, Death with Dignity Laws: A Plea for Uniform Legislation, 5 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 105 (1982).
104. Id. at 140.
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statutes. 10 5 In 1983, the preparation of a uniform natural
death act became a central focus of the ULC.
2. The ULC at Work: The History of the URTIA
a. Assessing the Need for a Uniform Living Will Law
The task of drafting any uniform or model law is carried
out by an elaborate committee structure within the ULC. Ini-
tially, the Scope and Review Committee of the ULC screens
requests for new drafting projects. Interest in a uniform act
addressing the "withdrawal of life support measures (the liv-
ing will issue)" was evidenced as early as February of 1977 in
a committee report of the ULC.I°6
In 1978 the ULC Executive Committee authorized the
appointment of a special committee to study the practicality
and necessity for a Uniform Natural Death Act. 0 7 This com-
mittee was directed to obtain input by contacting the appro-
priate representatives of the American Bar Association, the
Catholic Hospital Association, and the Society for the Right
to Die. This study committee concluded in 1982 that "there is
a need for uniform legislation addressing the right of a termi-
nally ill competent adult to control the use of life-sustaining
procedures that merely prolong life."' 8
b. The Drafting of the URTIA
The Executive Committee of the ULC authorized the ap-
pointment of a Drafting Committee on the Rights of the Ter-
minally Ill Act in February, 1983.109 A twelve-member
105. Id. at 137-40.
106. See Minutes of the Executive Committee of the National Conference on Uni-
form States Laws (Midyear Meeting, Feb. 12, 1977), reprinted in HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS EIGHTY-SIXTH YEAR 114,
117 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 HANDBOOK].
107. See Minutes of the First Meeting of the Executive Committee (July 27, 1978),
reprinted in 1978 HANDBOOK, supra note 93, at 95, 98.
108. Report of the Scope & Program Committee (Jan. 1982) reprinted in 1982
HANDBOOK, supra note 97, at 103. Natural death legislation at the time (i.e., January,
1982) had been enacted by at least ten states and introduced in twenty-one others. Id.
109. Minutes of the Executive Committee Midyear Meeting (Feb. 5, 1983) reprinted
in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS
NINETY-SECOND YEAR, 100-01 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 HANDBOOK]. The Executive
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committee was appointed to draft the new law. Members
were selected to ensure expertise, as well as divergent view-
points. Both legal and nonlegal experts and such groups as
the American Hospital Association, the United States Catho-
lic Conference, the ABA's Committee on Legal Problems of
the Elderly, the Catholic Health Association of the United
States, and the Society for the Right to Die were invited to
provide specialized knowledge to the drafting committee. 10
However, all decisions were made by the commissioners, who
represented only the people of their states.
Preliminary drafts were prepared and circulated to com-
mittee advisors, individuals and organizations interested in
the committee's work, and all uniform law commissioners.
Eventually, the drafting committee presented its tentative
draft, for initial consideration by the ULC, at an annual meet-
ing in August of 1984.111
The committee's tentative draft of the URTIA was read
"line by line" at the 1984 annual meeting and then discussed
and debated." 2 With more than 200 commissioners partici-
pating in the annual meeting, it is not surprising that the ini-
tial draft of the URTIA was amended during the process.
Controversial issues or questions were decided by polling state
delegations, each state having one vote.' 13
After the initial consideration at the August, 1984, an-
Committee instructed the Drafting Committee to prepare a uniform act "concerned
with the desire of a competent adult as to the use and control of life-sustaining proce-
dures which would merely prolong his life, if he should become terminally ill." Id. at
101.
110. In addition to these groups, "valuable inputs" were received from the ABA
Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law and the American Society of Law and
Medicine. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE TER-
MINALLY ILL ACT 7-8 (Aug. 1, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 PROCEEDINGS OF THE COM-
MITTEE OF THE WHOLE]. The Drafting Committee also gave the AMA and the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals opportunities to comment on the drafts of
the act. Id. at 8.
11. See id. at 1-102.
112. See id. at 8-102.
113. See, e.g., id. at 38-44 (reflecting the debate and defeat of a motion to require
that a patient's declaration be "acknowledged before a notary public of this State"); id.
at 82-94 (setting forth the discussion of the "penalties" section of the draft and the
defeat of a motion that civil sanctions be drafted as an alternative to criminal penalties
for conduct such as the willful failure by a physician to transfer a patient or to record
the determination of the terminal condition). For a description of how the conference
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nual meeting, the ULC committees resumed their work, in-
corporating changes made during the annual meeting and
addressing new problems posed by commissioners. The
URTIA, like all proposed uniform laws, was subjected to this
rigorous procedure for at least two annual meetings before it
became eligible for designation as an ULC product.
The final decision on whether any proposal, such as the
URTIA draft, is ready for "promulgation" to the states is
made near the end of an annual meeting; again, each jurisdic-
tion has one vote. A majority of states present, but no fewer
than twenty states, must approve an act before it can be offi-
cially adopted by the ULC as a uniform or model proposal.'1 4
The URTIA was approved in August of 1985, with thirty-
seven jurisdictions voting for the Act and only ten voting
against it. Two states abstained, while three jurisdictions
failed to vote. 115
III. THE UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE.
TERMINALLY ILL ACT (URTIA)
A. Overview of the URTIA
As previously described, the ULC's multi-year study and
two-year drafting effort culminated in the 1985 approval of
the URTIA. Although the Quinlan case had stimulated inter-
est in the adoption of the nation's first living will law in Cali-
fornia in 1976, ironically the Uniform Act does not
encompass patients like Karen Quinlan, in a permanently un-
conscious but not terminally ill state." 6 Consequently, a sig-
nificant category of patients cannot benefit from the Uniform
Act.
works, see Uniform Law Commissioners, A Tradition of Excellence (Monograph) [here-
inafter A Tradition of Excellence].
114. See A Tradition of Excellence, supra note 113, at 4. See also Explanation, Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 9 U.L.A. Part I (1988).
For the final reading, debate, and vote on the URTIA, see PROCEEDINGS OF THE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS IN COMMITFEE
OF THE WHOLE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT 1-384 (Aug. 3.4, 7,
1985) [hereinafter 1985 PROCEEDINGS].
115. See Marzen, infra note 232, at 441 n.1 (listing those states voting for and
against the approval of the URTIA).




The title of the Uniform Act suggests that it encompasses
all terminally ill patients; however, its scope is actually quite
narrow. Most succinctly stated, the URTIA authorizes an
adult (a person age eighteen or older) who is of sound mind to
control decisions regarding administration of life-prolonging
treatment. The adult may exercise such control by executing
a written declaration instructing a physician to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment in the event the declarant
is in a terminal condition and is unable to participate in medi-
cal treatment decisions." 7
A terminal condition is one that is "incurable and irre-
versible" and that will result in death "within a relatively
short time" if life-sustaining treatment is not administered."18
The medical procedures or interventions which may be for-
gone are those that "serve only to prolong the process of dy-
ing.""' 9 Thus, just as the California Natural Death Act has
been criticized for covering "only patients ... who are on the
edge of death despite the doctor's efforts," a major defect of the
Uniform Act is its application to such a narrow and less prob-
lematic group of dying patients. 20
As a result, the URTIA is most significant for the indi-
viduals whose situations it does not encompass and whose
rights it does not address. Those individuals include: (1) mi-
nors; (2) persons who have not executed an advance directive;
(3) adults who have never had decisional capacity to execute a
declaration; and, (4) non-terminal patients who are perma-
nently unconscious. 21 Unfortunately the ULC has not of-
fered any substantively meaningful law to fill the legislative
void left by such groupings.
The vehicle utilized in the Uniform Act for the imple-
mentation of a terminally ill patient's decisions is also very
restrictive. When the Act was being drafted, natural death
acts in seven states 122 explicitly recognized two types of ad-
117. URTIA, supra note 3, Prefatory Note.
118. Id. § 1(9).
119. Id. § 1(4).
120. Capron, The Development of Law on Human Death 315 ANNALS OF N.Y.
ACADEMY OF SCIENCE 45 (1978).
121. URTIA, supra note 3, Prefatory Note.
122. The states were Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983)),
Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 (West Supp. 1986)), Louisiana (LA. REV.
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vance declarations, a treatment directive and a proxy direc-
tive. A treatment directive sets forth the medical treatments
or interventions that the declarant desires to forgo in the event
the declarant is in a specified condition and lacks decisional
capacity. 123 A proxy directive is the declarant's written ap-
pointment of another individual to make medical decisions for
the declarant if the declarant becomes incapable of making
medical decisions. 12
4
Because of the wide range of variations in medical condi-
tions and the vagaries of patient responses to medical treat-
ment, the ideal natural death act should provide patients with
the flexibility to execute an advance declaration which in-
cludes both treatment and proxy features. As discussed ear-
lier, the President's Commission Report, which was
completed well before serious drafting was under way on the
Uniform Act, recognized the importance of a personally ap-
pointed proxy decision-maker familiar with the patient's val-
ues and wishes and able to promote the underlying principles
of autonomy and self-determination of the declarant. As the
President's Commission observed, "by combining a proxy di-
rective with specific instructions, an individual could control
both the content and the process of decisionmaking about care
in case of incapacity."' 125
In addition, the Right to Refuse Treatment Act, devel-
oped in 1983 by the Legal Advisers Committee of Concern for
Dying, recognized the utility of providing both treatment di-
rectives and proxy directives. 126 Unfortunately, the Uniform
Act authorizes only treatment directives. 127 The mission of
STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1988)), Texas (TExi. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1989)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118
(Supp. 1988)), Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:11-:13 (Repl. 1988)), and Wyo-
ming (Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (Supp. 1988)).
123. Hastings Center Guidelines, infra note 302, at 141, definition 14. A living will
is one type of treatment directive. Id.
124. Id. at 78-81, 141, definition 20. A "durable power of attorney" is a common
form of proxy directive, but it is not the only form. Id. at 80.
125. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 46, at 149.
126. Legal Advisers Committee, Concern for Dying, supra note 22, at 918.
127. URTIA, supra note 3, at §§ 1(2), 2(a). While proxy directives are not ex-
pressly authorized, it should be noted that the form of declaration set forth in the stat-
ute is not mandatory. Id. § 2(b). Thus, it can be argued that the declarant retains the
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the URTIA Drafting Committee, however, apparently was
not to formulate a comprehensive and practical uniform natu-
ral death act but, instead, to draft a narrow one.
B. Procedural and Substantive Operation of the URTIA
1. The Execution of a Declaration
An adult of sound mind may execute at any time a decla-
ration governing the abatement of life-sustaining treatment.128
The declaration must be in writing, signed by the declarant or
by someone at the declarant's direction, and witnessed by two
individuals.' 29  These requirements are very similar to,
although somewhat simpler than, those set forth in the Uni-
form Probate Code for the execution of a formally attested
property will.130
The utilization of property will requirements as a model
for a living will or advance directive incorporates at least one
potential problem. The choice of the term "sound mind,"
without a definition of its meaning in the context of a treat-
ment directive, is somewhat problematic. While state will acts
typically do not define "sound mind," there is a body of com-
mon law that has carefully defined this term for purposes of
capacity to execute a property will. 131
In the context of informed refusals of medical treatment,
several different approaches have been suggested to ascertain a
patient's competence.' 32 The President's Commission Report
identified three common methods for assessing decisional ca-
pacity: (1) "outcome approach," whereby decisions not re-
right to modify the declaration to designate a proxy decision-maker. See Cohen, Ap-
pointing a Proxyfor Health-Care Decisions, Society for the Right to Die Monograph No.
6 (Sept. 1986). Because it remains largely untested legally, this approach to designating
such a proxy is risky.
128. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 2(a) (1987).
129. Id. §§ 1(2), 2(a).
130. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-501 to -502 (1982).
131. W. McGOVERN, S. KURTZ, & J. REIN, WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 274
(1988). Most cases employ the following formula in defining testamentary capacity:
One has the requisite capacity to execute a will if, at the time of execution, she or he can
understand (1) the nature and extent of her/his property; (2) the persons who are the
natural objects of her/his bounty; and (3) the disposition she or he is making of her/his
property in the will. Id. at 274-76.
132. See, e.g., Annas & Densberger, Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment: Au-
tonomy vs. Paternalism, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
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flecting community values are used as evidence of lack of
competence; (2) "status approach," whereby an individual's
competence is based on his physical or mental status, consid-
ering factors such as consciousness, age, mental or physical
diagnosis; and (3) "functioning approach," which focuses on
the individual's actual functioning in decision-making situa-
tions.1 33 In the context of the URTIA, a more precise term
than "sound mind" or "competence" is needed. "Decision-
making capacity" is a viable alternative. If used, this term
should be expressly defined, based on the "functioning" or
"process" approach, to mean the ability or capacity of the de-
clarant to understand and appreciate the nature and conse-
quences of his decisions.1 34 While "sound mind" may connote
a process standard, patient rights are better protected with a
more precise and appropriate term.
The witnesses to a treatment declaration, executed pursu-
ant to the URTIA, do not have to meet any specific qualifica-
tions.135 In this regard, the Act is a major improvement over
many existing state laws 136 which preclude a number of indi-
viduals-including the declarant's spouse, blood relatives,
heirs apparent or prospective devisees and legatees, and em-
ployees of a health-care provider-from serving as witnesses
to a living will.
The URTIA is designed to make the execution of a living
will as uncomplicated as possible. The absence of more strin-
gent witness requirements is intended to relieve physicians of
the difficult burden of determining whether the legalities of
the witness requirements have been met. 137 The inclusion of
elaborate qualifications could create understandable hesitancy
by physicians to make decisions based upon a declaration. 138
Thus, more complex execution requirements pose the risk of
jeopardizing the effectiveness of a patient's declaration.
Patient autonomy is much better served by the Uniform
.133. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 46, at 152.
134. Annas & Densberger, supra note 132, at 591.
135. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 2 comment at 614.
136. See, e.g., Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 63-3103
(West Supp. 1989).
137. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 2 comment at 615.
138. Id. comment at 616.
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Act than by the statutes that preclude certain categories of
witnesses. In fact, the experience with organ donor cards sug-
gests the desirability of having family members serve as wit-
nesses. A potential organ donor's wishes are less likely to be
frustrated when the matter has been discussed with family
members who have then served as witnesses to the execution
of the organ donor card. 139 Similarly, if a declarant first dis-
cusses treatment preferences with family members who then
witness the execution of the living will, these same witnesses
will likely better understand the document and insist that the
dying patient's preferences are respected by health-care
providers.
The Uniform Act's provisions dealing with the form of
the declaration also promote the patient's right of self-
determination. Although the Act includes a sample form, an
individual's actual declaration need not comply with the
form.140 Because use of the form is not mandatory, an indi-
vidual's declaration may be more elaborate. The Act does not
prohibit the inclusion of language designating a proxy for
health-care decision-making purposes. However, inclusions
and modifications of this nature are essentially untested.1 4'
Ideally, a living will should be tailored to each declarant,
specifically explaining preferences about life-sustaining treat-
ment. 14 2 The drafting flexibility afforded by the Uniform Act
seems to promote the individualized expression of the declar-
ant's treatment choices more effectively than would a statu-
tory form allowing little or no deviation.
In sum, the Uniform Act's provisions regarding the form
and execution of a treatment declaration are a major improve-
ment over those of many statutes. Legislation of this nature
should promote the declarant's autonomy and right of self-
determination. The simplified witness provisions, the absence
139. A report by the Hastings Center noted that "while the aim of current public
policy is to maximize the right of each person to control what happens to his body upon
death, the reality is that families continue to play a central role in deciding whether
organ donation will take place." THE HASTINGS CENTER, ETHICAL, LEGAL, & POLICY
ISSUES PERTAINING TO SOLID ORGAN PROCUREMENT, A REPORT OF THE PROJECT
ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 16 (1985).
140. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 2(b) & comment at 614.
141. See discussion supra at note 127.
142. Hastings Center Guidelines, infra note 302, at 82.
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of a mandatory form, and the lack of burdensome execution
features such as a notarization requirement are all designed to
facilitate the execution of an instrument which expresses the
specific preferences of the declarant.
The Uniform Act also permits a physician or other
health-care provider to presume that a declaration complies
with the act and is valid in the absence of knowledge to the
contrary.1 43 Thus, the streamlined execution provisions, cou-
pled with the presumption of validity, greatly minimize the
possibility that a treatment declaration will be challenged on
formalistic grounds.
2. Safeguards Against Abuse, Duress, or Wrongdoing
Because the execution of a valid declaration is quite sim-
ple under the URTIA, the ULC was cognizant of the poten-
tial for abuse, duress, or wrongdoing by overreaching family
members, caretakers, or health-care providers. The ULC ad-
dressed the potential for abuse with two different approaches:
(1) a simplified revocation procedure, and (2) imposition of
criminal sanctions for specifically defined conduct not other-
wise covered by state criminal codes.'"
a. The Provision of Criminal Penalties
to Protect Patients
The potential for abuse created by the simplified execu-
tion requirements is addressed by the criminal penalties pre-
scribed by the Uniform Act. Any person who falsifies or
forges a declaration or willfully conceals or withholds per-
sonal knowledge of a revocation is guilty of a misdemeanor. 45
Coercing or fraudulently inducing another to execute a decla-
ration is also a misdemeanor.1 46 Similarly, anyone "who re-
quires or prohibits the execution of a declaration as a
condition for being insured [for health care services] or receiv-
ing health care services" is guilty of a misdemeanor.147 Fi-
nally, the penalties set forth in the Act supplement rather than
143. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 11.
144. Id. § 2 comment at 615.
145. Id. § 9(d).
146. Id. § 9(f).
147. Id. § 9(e).
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displace any sanctions applicable under other civil or criminal
laws. 148 Proscribed conduct, such as the willful forgery of a
declaration or the willful concealment of a revocation, need
not actually cause the death of a declarant in order to be sanc-
tioned as a criminal misdemeanor under the Uniform Act. 49
b. URTIA Revocation Procedures
The ULC also simplified and streamlined revocation re-
quirements. The document may be revoked "at any time and
in any manner by the declarant, without regard to the declar-
ant's mental or physical condition." 150
This approach departs'markedly from the legal require-
ments for the revocation of property wills, of which an essen-
tial element is adequate legal capacity.' 5 ' The recognition of a
revocation without regard to capacity reflects the policy
choice of "err[ing] on the side of prolonging life."' 52 Unfortu-
nately, the failure to require adequate capacity to revoke may
ultimately frustrate some patients' rights of self-
determination.
The URTIA permits revocation by a broad range of
methods-a marked departure from existing state statutes.
Virtually every other living will law, following the pattern of
state statutes governing property wills, delineates specific ex-
amples of how a declaration can be revoked. 53 Unlike the
typical provisions governing the revocation of property wills,
the URTIA permits oral revocations, as well as those revoca-
tions manifested "by physical sign communicating intention
to revoke." 54 The intent of the revocation provisions is to
freely allow revocation and to avoid procedural complica-
tions. However, the authorization of revocations "in any
manner" and without regard to the patient's decision-making
148. Id. § 9(g).
149. Id. § 9 comment at 620.
150. Id. § 4(a).
151. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
152. Marzen, infra note 232, at 472.
153. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 63-3104(A) (West Supp. 1989) (meth-
ods include, but are not limited to, "[b]eing canceled, defaced, obliterated, burnt, torn,
or otherwise destroyed by the declarant or by some person in his presence and by his
direction").
154. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 4(a) & comment at 616.
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capacity may present serious problems of interpretation when
a patient has fluctuating decisional capacity.' 55 Needless to
say, vague and ambiguous communication by a patient who
lacks capacity or whose decision-making abilities are question-
able is to be construed as a revocation. Again, the better pol-
icy seems to support erring on the side of prolonging life.
The simplified but more "liberalized" revocation provi-
sions create the potential for misrepresentation that a revoca-
tion has occurred. In an effort to curb such abuses, the
URTIA prescribes a misdemeanor penalty for any individual
"who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, or obliterates the
declaration of another without the declarant's consent or who
falsifies or forges a revocation."' 156
Finally, "[a] revocation is effective only upon communi-
cation to the attending physician or other health care provider
by the declarant or a witness to the revocation."' 157 A health-
care professional enjoys immunity from civil or criminal lia-
bility and professional disciplinary actions for carrying out a
declaration in the absence of knowledge of a revocation.' 58
3. Persons Unaffected by the Act
The URTIA is not intended to affect the existing rights
and responsibilities of any patient to make medical treatment
decisions as long as the patient is able to do so.' 59 Nor is the
Act intended to impair or supersede any right or responsibility
that a person has to effect the withholding or withdrawal of
medical care. 16 Finally, while the URTIA does not apply to
some patients-such as the permanently unconscious-the
rights of these patients have been greatly enhanced by pro-
gressive judicial interpretation of the constitutional right of
privacy, as well as by the cumulative nature of living will
legislation.16 1
155. Annas & Glantz, infra note 237, at 150; Marzen, infra note 232, at 472.
156. URTIA supra note 3, at § 9(c).
157. Id. § 4(a).
158. Id. 8(a).
159. Id. § 10(e).
160. Id.
161. See, Gray ex rel. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); In re Gard-
ner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass.
417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d .434, stay denied sub
1989] URTIA 357
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
C. Preconditions to the Declaration Becoming Operative
1. Criteria Triggering Operative Effect of a Living Will
A patient's living will or declaration becomes operative
when two criteria are fulfilled: (1) the communication of the
declaration by a qualified patient to the attending physician,
and (2) the determination by the attending physician that the
declarant is in a terminal condition and is no longer able to
make decisions regarding the administration of life-sustaining
treatment.' 62 The Uniform Act departs significantly from the
approach taken in a number of state statutes in that the Act
does not require that a physician other than the attending
physician concur in the prognosis that the patient's condition
is terminal. 163
Dispensing with the requirement of a second confirma-
tory diagnosis should promote patient autonomy in smaller or
rural health-care facilities where a second qualified physician
may not be readily available to confirm the attending physi-
cian's determination.' However, the established practice of
most physicians is to request either a second opinion or review
by an institutional ethics committee. 6  The Uniform Act
neither prohibits nor discourages this practice. The ULC
based their decision on the premise that requiring a specific
form of review of the attending physician's decision would be
an unnecessary regulation of normal hospital procedures.' 66
The heart of the Uniform Act is found in the definitions
of three key terms: (1) "qualified patient," (2) "terminal
condition," and (3) "life-sustaining treatment." The inter-
dependency of these definitions may prove to be a source of
nom., Lincoln Park Nursing & Convalescent Home v. Kahn, 108 S. Ct. 6 (1987). See
also In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988); Foody v.
Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Super. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (1984); Corbett v.
D'Allesandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. App. 1986). But see Cruzan v. Harmon v. Mc-
Canse, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (three regular justices and one special member of the
seven-member court concluding that there are "grave doubts as to the applicability of
[federal consitutional] privacy rights to decisions to terminate the provision of food and
water to an incompetent patient").
162. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 3.
163. Id. § 1(7).




confusion in implementing the URTIA. 167
A "qualified patient" is an individual, age eighteen or
older, who has executed a declaration and who has been deter-
mined to be in a terminal condition.'68 In accordance with a
1987 amendment to the URTIA, 169 "terminal condition" is an
incurable and irreversible condition that, without the adminis-
tration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of the
attending physician, result in death within a relatively short
time. "Life-sustaining treatment" is any medical procedure or
intervention that serves only to prolong the process of
dying. 170
The choice of "terminal condition" rather than "terminal
illness" is intentional. 7 While "terminal illness" connotes a
disease process that will lead inevitably to death, "terminal
condition" is not limited to disease. As explained previously,
the terminal condition definition is further limited by the re-
quirement that it be incurable and irreversible. Thus, a condi-
tion which is reversible but incurable (e.g., diabetes for which
insulin is used as a treatment) is not a terminal condition. Fi-
nally, the terminal condition element is also limited by -the re-
quirement that the condition must be one which causes the
death of the patient within a relatively short period of time. 172
The use of "relatively short period of time" as a qualifier
of terminal condition differs in degree from the language em-
ployed in most existing state statutes. A number of states re-
quire that death be "imminent" with or without the
application of life-sustaining procedures. 73 In contrast, the
determination of "relatively short time" under the Uniform
Act is to be made without considering the possibilities of
extending life with life-prolonging treatment. 74 Thus, the
167. Marzen, infra note 232, at 461.
168. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 1(7).
169. Id. § 1(9) (1988 Supp.). Previously, the statutory language had read "incur-
able or irreversible condition." URTIA § 1(9) (1985) (emphasis added). The original
wording had been the focus of sharp criticism. See Marzen, infra note 232, at 144-47.
170. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 1(4).
171. Id. § 1 comment.
172. Id.
173. Id. See also Annas & Glantz, infra note 237, at 139.
174. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 1.
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Uniform Act's approach represents a modest improvement
over the more restrictive state laws.
The President's Commission noted in 1983 that defini-
tions requiring "imminent" death severely limit the group of
terminally ill patients able to benefit from natural death
acts. 17 5 Living will laws should not be made wholly ineffective
with respect to the situations they purport to address. How-
ever, interpreted literally, the more restrictive provisions ap-
pear to have that effect.
The Virginia natural death act is illustrative of a more
narrowly drafted and, hence, potentially limiting statute be-
cause it employs the term "imminent."' 176 A circuit court in
Virginia recognized that interpreting "imminent" as "immedi-
ate, at once, within a day" would destroy the intent of the
state's act. 177 Although the Virginia court concluded that a
comatose patient "within a few months" of death met the re-
quirements of the Virginia statute, 178 a better approach is to
avoid this interpretation problem by drafting a more flexible
and realistic standard.
The "relatively short time" qualifier is employed as an
alternative not only to the unduly constricting term, "immi-
nent," but also as an option to the artificiality of fixed peri-
ods. 179 Circumstances and inevitable variations in illness and
prognosis make fixed time frames unrealistic.8 0 Under nar-
rowly prescribed time frames, physicians are understandably
more hesitant to make predictions about how long a patient
will live. The Uniform Act approach affords somewhat
greater flexibility and is intended to focus the physician's judg-
ment without unduly narrowing it. 181
Curiously, the "relatively short time" qualifier has been
criticized as being too ambiguous. The criticism focuses upon
the meaning of the term "relatively." To what does the term
175. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-Sus-
TAINING TREATMENT, supra note 46, at 143.
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (Repl. 1988).
177. Hazelton v. Powhatan Nursing Home, Inc., No. CH 98287 (Va. Cir. Ct.,
Fairfax Co., Aug. 29, Sept. 2, 1986), appeal denied, (Va. Sept. 2, 1986).
178. Id.




refer? Relative to other AIDS patients, other Alzheimer's pa-
tients, other lung cancer patients, or the patient population in
general?18 2
The application of any natural death statute to a particu-
lar patient inevitably involves judgment calls. On balance, the
flexible language employed in the Uniform Act is more likely
to enhance the patient's right of self-determination than are
the more restrictive alternatives.
2. Scope of Treatment that May Be
Withheld or Withdrawn
Life-sustaining treatment is defined by the URTIA to in-
clude any medical procedure or intervention serving only to
prolong the dying process. A separate provision states that
the responsibility of the physician to administer treatment, in-
cluding nutrition and hydration, for a patient's comfort care
or alleviation of pain remains unaffected by the Uniform
Act. 183
The URTIA differs markedly from most existing stat-
utes, especially those of recent vintage, which exclude comfort
care from the definition of life-sustaining treatment. 8 4 The
ULC addressed comfort care procedures separately because
they determined that many such procedures are life-sustaining
and do not involve a fixed group of procedures applicable in
all circumstances. 8 5 Thus, comfort care procedures may be
applied as dictated by reasonable medical standards to ensure
comfort and freedom from pain, notwithstanding an order di-
recting the physician to discontinue life-sustaining
treatment. 
86
The comfort care provision is not intended to establish a
separate rule governing the administration of nutrition or hy-
dration. Instead, the provision of artificial sustenance is
subject to the same considerations of necessity for comfort
care and alleviation of pain as are all other forms of
182. Marzen, infra note 232, at 465-66.
183. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 6(b).





life-prolonging treatment. 8 7  Artificially supplied nourish-
ment may be withdrawn if unnecessary for the patient's com-
fort or alleviation of pain. This approach contrasts sharply
with a number of existing state statutes that either treat nutri-
tion and hydration, in all cases, as comfort care that may not
be stopped, or explicitly exclude artificial sustenance from the
definition of life-sustaining treatment. 88
The URTIA was drafted during a time of national debate
among health-care professionals and medical ethicists over the
status of artificial sustenance. The debated issue was whether
the provision of nourishment through artificial means, such as
an intravenous feeding apparatus or a nasogastric tube, is
comfort care in all cases, or whether such procedures in some
cases merely extend the dying process. 8 9 In the final analysis,
the drafters of the Uniform Act determined that the attending
physician should decide whether such procedures should be
considered life-sustaining treatment or comfort care. 90
Subsequent to the approval of the Uniform Act, the
AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs issued a major
ethical opinion in March of 1986. The opinion unanimously
stated that it would be ethical for doctors to withhold all
means of life-prolonging medical treatment, including artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration, from either terminally ill or irre-
versibly comatose patients.' 9' This AMA Opinion allows life-
prolonging medical treatment to be discontinued, even if
death is not imminent, where there is adequate medical confir-
mation of the diagnosis that a patient's coma is irreversible.192
Under this AMA Opinion, physicians determine whether the
benefits of treatment to the patient outweigh the burdens,
while maintaining the dignity of the patient.19 3
187. Id.
188. See infra text accompanying note 263.
189. Otten, New "Wills", supra note 85, at 33, col. 4. See also, Otten, Life or Death,
Issue of Force-Feeding to Keep Patients Alive Enters Political Arena, Wall St. J., June 9,
1986, at 1, col. 1 (chronicling history of the "feeding issue").
190. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 6 comment.
191. Opinion of the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affair on Withholding
or Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment (Mar. 15, 1986) (par. 4) [hereinaf-
ter AMA Opinion]. See also Wallis, To Feed or Not to Feed, TIME, Mar. 31, 1986, at 60.
192. AMA Opinion, supra note 191.
193. Id.
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No physician nor other health-care provider is required
to take any action contrary to reasonable medical standards.
Some commentators have expressed concern that this lan-
guage may provide physicians with a potential escape hatch to
do what they wish, without regard to a patient's expressed di-
rections.'94 On the other hand, one can argue that the AMA
Opinion previously discussed establishes a national standard
of reasonableness within the profession.' Thus, the influen-
tial weight and persuasive value of the AMA Opinion may
reduce any potential tendency of physicians to arbitrarily in-
voke this escape hatch.
3. The Pregnancy Limitation
In some circumstances, the Uniform Act limits the
operative effect of a pregnant patient's order directing the dis-
continuance of life-sustaining treatment. The Act states that
unless the declaration otherwise provides, the declaration of a
qualified patient, known to the attending physician to be preg-
nant, must not be given effect as long as it is probable that,
with continued application of life-sustaining treatment, the fe-
tus could develop to the point of live birth. 9 6 Thus, the Act
expressly allows a declarant to address the issue of pregnancy
in advance.
The drafters comment that if a qualified patient has been
pregnant for only a few weeks, treatment may be withheld if
the physician, using reasonable medical standards, determines
that it is improbable that even with life-sustaining procedures
the fetus could develop to the point of viability. 97
The application of this provision, prior to fetal viability,
to terminally ill, pregnant women is subject to constitutional
194. Annas & Glantz, infra note 237, at 144.
195. Cf. Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968) (abandoning the
strict geographic locality rule in medical malpractice actions and commenting that the
medical profession should no longer be subject to varying geographic standards in mal-
practice cases). Given the trend in tort law to utilize a national standard in medical
malpractice actions,. there is no compelling reason not to require the same standard in
analyzing a physician's refusal to treat cases. Moreover, what better definition of "rea-
sonable medical standards" exists than that set forth in an opinion of the Ethical and
Judicial Affairs Council of the AMA, the nation's largest professional organization of
medical doctors.
196. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 6(c).
197. Id. § 6 comment at 612.
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challenge on both privacy and equal protection grounds. 198
However, the ULC did not overtly address such constitutional
issues. Instead, the Act's focus is on practical medical consid-
erations involving the fetus. The drafters were concerned that
a more widely applicable limitation might inadvertently cause
more harm than benefit to the fetus. They hypothesized a sce-
nario in which the administration of a life-sustaining treat-
ment, such as medication, might prove harmful or fatal to a
fetus. '99
In drafting this provision, the ULC attempted to strike a
balance between honoring the autonomy of qualified patients
and protecting the likelihood of life for the fetus. As a result,
the pregnancy provision in the URTIA is much more compli-
cated and differs significantly from many existing state laws °.2 °
Existing state statutes which have addressed the pregnant
patient situation typically stipulate that the declaration is
given no force or effect during pregnancy.2°' Such a broad
pregnancy limitation, applied to the period of pregnancy pre-
ceding fetal viability, would certainly raise constitutional
issues.2 °2
198. See Annas & Glantz, infra note 237, at 143. However, these two commenta-
tors seem to ignore the qualifier in the statute "unless the declaration otherwise pro-
vides" and the comment by the drafters. Cf In re A.C, 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. App.
1987) (analyzed the rights of a terminally ill woman who was forced to undergo a caesa-
rian section to deliver her twenty-six week fetus). For a discussion of In re A.C., see
Annas, She's Going to Die: The Case of Angela C, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP., 23-25
(February 1988).
199. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 6 comment at 618.
200. Id. at 617-18.
201. See, e.g., Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act, IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-11(e) (Bums Supp. 1988).
202. Cf Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). See Greenhouse, Abortion: The Justices' Ambiguous Move, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 15, 1989, at 28E, col. I (natl. ed.) (exploring the ramifications of the Supreme
Court's recent decision to hear the appeal of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services).
For a recent examination of the Supreme Court's "trimester approach," see Mangel,
Legal Abortion: The Impending Obsolescence of the Trimester Framework, 14 AM. J.
LAW & MED. 69 (1988).
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D. Role of Attending Physician and
Health-Care Providers
1. Specific Duties and Responsibilities
Once a physician or other health-care provider is fur-
nished with a copy of a patient's declaration, the declaration
must be added to the patient's medical record.2 °3 If the at-
tending physician or other health-care provider is unwilling to
comply with the declaration, the declarant must promptly be
so advised. 2°4
However, no section explicitly requires that the physician
inform the patient of the terminal condition. 205 The decision
to advise the patient of his terminal condition is left to the
physician's professional judgment under existing standards of
care. The common law doctrine of informed consent gener-
ally recognizes a physician's therapeutic privilege to withhold
information that would be harmful to the patient. 20 6
As previously explained, the attending physician is re-
sponsible for determining when the declarant is in a terminal
condition and no longer able to make treatment decisions.
When the living will becomes operative by virtue of such a
determination, the attending physician, or other health-care
provider must act in accordance with its provisions or "as
promptly as practicable take all reasonable steps" to transfer
care of the declarant to another physician or health-care pro-
vider.20 7 A physician or health-care provider who willfully
fails to transfer the patient may be found guilty of a
misdemeanor.2 o8
Upon determining that the condition of the declarant is
terminal, the attending physician who knows of a declaration
must record his determination of the patient's condition and
203. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 2(c).
204. Id. § 2(c).
.205. Annas & Glantz, infra note 237, at 143.
206. See M. MCCAFFERTY & S. MEYER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE BASES OF LIA-
BILITY 277, § 11.09 (1985). Given the reliance upon the doctrine of informed consent
that underlies the right of self-determination to refuse medical treatment, the courts
would logically draw upon the therapeutic privilege cases in determining the reasona-
bleness of the physician's action.
207. URTIA, supra note 3, at § 7.
208. Id. § 9(a).
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the terms of the declaration in the patient's medical record."
A physician who willfully fails to record this determination
may also be subject to a misdemeanor sanction.2"'
2. Immunities Afforded to Health-Care Providers
The immunities afforded under the URTIA are similar to
those found in most existing natural death statutes. In the
absence of knowledge of the revocation of a declaration, a per-
son carrying out a declaration pursuant to the Uniform Act is
subject neither to, civil or criminal liability nor to discipline for
unprofessional conduct. 21' Moreover, as previously explained,
a physician or other health-care provider whose acts are in
accord with reasonable medical standards is similarly immune
from liability, as well as from professional discipline.21 2
The URTIA extends these immunities not only to physi-
cians, but also to persons acting under the physician's direc-
tion or authorization, as well as to hospitals and other
institutions in which the abatement of treatment occurs.213
Following the standard guiding all decisions made under the
Act,21 4 immunity exists as long as reasonable medical stan-
dards are maintained. 21 5
E. Other Significant Provisions of the URTIA
1. Relationship of Treatment Abatement to Suicide,
Homicide, Insurance, and Provision of Health-
Care Services
The Uniform Act parallels the approach of most existing
statutes regarding the relationship of treatment abatement to
matters involving suicide, homicide, life insurance, and the
availability of health-care services. The Act stipulates that
death resulting from the withholding or withdrawal of treat-
ment pursuant to a declaration, and in accordance with the
Act, does not constitute for any purpose a suicide or
209. Id. § 5.
210. Id. § 9(b).
211. Id. § 8(a).
212. Id. § 8(b).




homicide; nor does it legally'impair or invalidate a life insur-
ance policy or annuity.216 The execution of a living will by a
patient does not affect the sale, procurement, or issuance of a
life insurance policy, annuity, or the terms of existing poli-
cies.21 No one can prohibit or require the execution of a dec-
laration as a condition for health insurance or the receipt of
health-care services.218
2. Extraterritorial Recognition of Declarations
Americans enjoy greater mobility than ever as a result of
the urbanization of the United States. It is not unusual for a
patient with a terminal condition to seek or require care from
a health-care facility in a state other than the patient's domi-
cile. Unfortunately, most living will statutes enacted prior to
1985 failed to address the problem of the extraterritorial effect
of living wills. 219 Consequently, one important feature of the
Uniform Act is its provision expressly recognizing the extra-
territorial validity of a patient's living will. The URTIA pro-
vides that a living will executed in another state in compliance
with the law of that state or of the enacting state is validly
executed for purposes of the Act.22° However, the operation of
the declaration in the enacting state is subject to the substan-
tive policies of the enacting state's law.221
3. Effect of Living Wills Executed Prior to the URTIA
Another positive feature of the URTIA is a grandfather
clause which validates instruments executed before the effec-
tive date of a state's adoption of the URTIA. However, the
prior instrument must substantially comply with the execu-
tion requirements of the Uniform Act.222 In view of the vast
numbers of living will forms distributed by organizations such
as the Society for the Right to Die, Concern for Dying, and
the Hemlock Society, 223 the grandfather clause is a potentially
216. Id. §§ 10(a), (b).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 10(c).
219. Id. § 12 comment at 621.
220. Id. § 12.
221. Id. § 12 comment at 621.
222. Id. § 13.
223. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
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important provision supporting the self-determination rights
of patients who previously used these forms to execute living
wills.
IV. REACTION TO AND INFLUENCE OF
THE UNIFORM ACT, 1985-88
Receptivity to the URTIA may be gauged by the re-
sponses and reactions of a number of sources: the legal and
medical communities, professional and scholarly literature,
and special advocacy groups. In the final analysis, the most
important barometer is the influence which a uniform law has
upon state legislation adopted within the first few years fol-
lowing the ULC approval of the act.
A. Receptivity to the URTIA
1. Response of the Legal and Medical Communities
The ABA House of Delegates approved the URTIA
without debate at its mid-year meeting in 1986.224 In addi-
tion, the Uniform Act has received the endorsements of vari-
ous ABA subgroups including the Section on Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law, the Torts and Insurance Practice Sec-
tion, and the Council on Legal Problems of the Elderly.225
Oiven the commonality of membership that exists between the
ABA and the ULC, 226 these endorsements are not surprising.
SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 46, at 139-40. In addition to the Society for the
Right to Die, Concern for Dying, and the Hemlock Society, other organizations which
have promulgated living will forms include the American Protestant Hospital Associa-
tion, the American Catholic Hospital Association, the American Public Health Associ-
ation. Id. at 139 n.5 1. Recently, the president of Concern for Dying reported that this
group has distributed living will forms to over eight million people in response to re-
quests. Letter of James R. Sheffield, President, Concern for Dying, to Friends of Con-
cern for Dying (Nov. 22, 1988). A.J. Levinson, the immediate past executive director of
Concern for Dying, has also instituted the Living Will Registry. A-JLevinson Retires as
Executive Director, CONCERN FOR DYING NEWSLETrER, Fall 1988, at 2, col. 1 (Vol.
14, .no. 3).
224. Blodgett, New "Living Wills, " AM. BAR J., Sept. 1, 1986, at 24, col. 2.
225. Letter from Richard C. Hite to Marguerite Chapman (July 24, 1986) [herein-
after Hite Letter].
226. See 1978 HANDBOOK, supra note 93, at 267 (describing the historical role of
the ABA in establishing the National Conference). Uniform Law Commissioners "are
chosen from the legal profession, being lawyers and judges of standing and experience,
and teachers of law in some of the leading law schools." Id.
368
Within the health-care community, the Uniform Act has
been officially endorsed only by the American Hospice
Association.227 While a perception exists that the medical
community is generally supportive of the Uniform Act,228
their low key response to the URTIA stands in stark contrast
to earlier reaction to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. In
part because of the health-care community's concerted efforts,
all fifty states and the District of Columbia had adopted the
UAGA, without major modification, by 1971-just three
years after ULC approval.229
The issuance of AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs Opinion on Withholding and Withdrawing Life-
Sustaining Treatment, 230 along with the formulation of similar
guidelines by state and local medical associations, 2a1 may have
lessened interest in the Uniform Act among the medical pro-
fession. Certainly, the URTIA does not seem to be a priority
issue for the medical profession and other health-care
providers.
2. Commentary on the Uniform Act in the Literature
Assessments of the URTIA in professional and scholarly
journals have been mixed. One of the earliest analyses was
written by Thomas Marzen in 1986.232 Mr. Marzen, legal
counsel for the National Legal Center for the Medically
227. Hite Letter, supra note 225.
228. Id.
229. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act was completed on July 30, 1968, and ap-
proved by the ABA on August 7, 1968. Sadler & Sadler, Organ Donation: Is Volunta-
rism Still Valid?, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., 6, 7 (October 1984). In September of
1968, the National Research Council called a national meeting to mobilize support for
the UAGA; the meeting brought together representatives of the medical academic com-
munity and major scientific organizations involved in organ recovery and transplanta-
tion. Id. Articles about the UAGA were written and published in medical and legal
journals. Id. During 1969 forty-one of forty-four state legislatures which met adopted
the UAGA.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 191-95 (discussing the issuance, signifi-
cance, implications of the AMA Opinion).
231. In January of 1986, the Los Angeles County Medical Association and the Los
Angeles County Bar Association developed guidelines to address the confusion faced by
health-care professionals when dealing with treatment abatement decisions. Blodgett,
Guidancefor LA. Physicians, A.B.A. J., 24 (Sept. 1, 1986). The Massachusetts Medical
Society has developed similar guidelines.
232. Marzen, The "Uniform Rights of the Terminally lllAct": A Critical Analysis, I
IssuEs IN LAW & MED. 441 (1986).
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Dependent & Disabled,233 was quite critical of the Uniform
Act. Consonant with the goals of his organization, he focused
on what he perceived to be (1) the lack of adequate protection
against "the prospect that the declaration was invalidly exe-
cuted by reason of incompetence, minority, fraud, or coer-
cion," and (2) the "exceedingly broad discretionary authority
... granted to the attending physician to determine when a
declaration would become effective. '234 In his view, the "lack
of safeguards pose the potential that the Act could occasion
abuse by those who wish to see treatment foregone from
others. ' '235  Mr. Marzen concluded that in most respects, the
act "represents a step away from autonomous patient medical
decisionmaking and a step toward logical confusion, unbal-
anced physician discretion, and potential abuse. 236
Professors George Annas and Leonard Glantz, two
highly respected bioethicists, have also been highly critical of
the URTIA, but from a perspective entirely different from
that of Mr. Marzen. Commenting on the rights of elderly pa-
tients to refuse life-prolonging treatment, 237 Annas and Glantz
list a number of shortcomings of the URTIA. These deficien-
cies include the impractical and overly restrictive definitions
of "life sustaining treatment" and "terminal condition"; revo-
cation of an instrument without regard to the mental condi-
tion of the declarant; constitutional problems associated with
the pregnancy limitation; and the failure to provide a course
of action for a physician to follow when there is disagreement
with the wishes of the declarant and an inability to transfer
233. An Introduction to the National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent &
Disabled, Inc., I IssuEs LAW & MED. 1, 9 (1985). The National Legal Center for the
Medically Dependent and Disabled, Inc., is a non-profit, publicly supported foundation,
a primary goal of which is "[t]o insure that the right of medically dependent persons to
beneficial medical treatment without regard to age, health, function, condition of depen-
dency or disability is adequately represented and fully protected." Id. at 2, 9, 10. Is-
SUES LAW & MEDICINE, a bimonthly publication of the Center, was first published in
July, 1985. Id. at 11. The president of the National Legal Center and chief executive
officer of the corporation is James Bopp, Jr. Id. at 9. Mr. Bopp is also General Counsel
of the National Right to Life Committee. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1988, at 10, col. 6 (nat'l
ed.).
234. Marzen, supra note 232, at 475.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Annas & Glantz, The Right of Elderly Patients to Refuse Life-Sustaining
Treatment, 64 MILBANK Q. 95 (1986).
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the patient to someone who will honor those wishes.238
Professors Annas and Glantz are also troubled by the
"reasonable medical standards" qualification, based on the
physician's potential'to rely on this provision "to do whatever
he or she wants regardless of the patient's stated views in the
declaration. ' 239 They are also particularly critical of the ap-
plication of the URTIA "to tiny categories of patients and
treatments"; the failure to provide for a health-care proxy or
standards for surrogate decision-making; the lack of penalties
for health-care professionals who do not follow the terms of a
declaration; and the omission of language explicitly requiring
the provision of palliative care.24 In sum, "the act addressees
only one major shortcoming of current laws: the lack of uni-
formity. It leaves the other.., shortcomings intact; worse, it
seems to institutionalize and approve them."'24'
On the positive side, Professor Carol Ann Mooney of the
Notre Dame Law School has recommended that the Indiana
legislature replace its Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Proce-
dures Act with the URTIA. In a recent article,242 Professor
Mooney carefully compares and contrasts the provisions of
the Indiana statute with the Uniform Act, finally determining
that "[t]he Uniform Act is superior to the existing Indiana
Act in several ways. ' 24 3 This superiority results from broader
definitions of terms such as "terminal condition," "life-
sustaining procedures," and "qualified patient." Additionally,
under the URTIA, physicians are not burdened with the ne-
cessity of determining the legal validity of a declaration, as
they are under Indiana law.
In another recent article by Professor Gregory Gelfand of
the Delaware Law School, references to the Uniform Act are
238. Id. at 142-44.
239. Id. at 144.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Mooney, Indiana's Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act: A Re-
form Proposal, 20 IND. L. REV. 539 (1987).
243. Id. at 557. More recently, the URTIA has received mixed reviews from Prof.
George J. Alexander in an article focusing on California law. Alexander, Death by
Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 67, 96-98 (1988). See also Comment, Choosing
How to Die: The Needfor Reform of Oregon's Living Will Legislation, 23 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 69 (1987) (favorably comparing Oregon law with the Uniform Act).
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contained throughout a meticulous analysis of all thirty-nine
state living will laws. Gelfand concludes by offering his own
model statute. 2" Gelfand's model statute includes more com-
plete definition of terms and incorporates the author's resolu-
tion of some competing concerns left unaddressed by various
state statutes.. ,. . .
3. Reactions of Special Advocacy Groups to the URTIA
Support for and opposition to the Uniform Act have
come from expected special advocacy groups. Derek Hum-
phry and Ann Wickett, co-founders of the Hemlock Society of
Los Angeles, listed the URTIA as one of the three "best ex-
amples" of "laws that enhance the rights of the dying" in their
1986 book, The Right to Die, Understanding Euthanasia.245
The Society for the Right to Die has also commented favora-
bly on the URTIA,246 and, according to one report, the Grey
Panthers of California, an activist senior citizens group, have
endorsed the URTIA and have actively sought its legislative
consideration in California.247
On the other hand, the entire right-to-life movement has
reportedly mobilized to oppose the URTIA. 248 Apparently,
the individuals and groups within the movement have coa-
lesced around the nutrition and hydration issue to gain popu-
lar support for their position.
In June of 1986, the Committee for Pro-Life Activities of
the National Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a state-
ment on the URTIA which cautioned that the Act "raise[s]
new and significant moral problems, highlighting the need for
serious debate on the purpose and risks of legislation on this
244. Gelfand, The First Decade, supra note 17, at 802-21.
245. HUMPHRY & WICKE'rI, supra note 23, at 314.
246. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF 1985 LIVING WILL LAWS
14-15 (1986). Although the Society for the Right to Die observed that the Uniform Act
"clearly emphasizes and encourages patient autonomy," the Society for the Right to Die
also noted that "[t]wo significant provisions are not included in the [ULC] Act: 1) the
added protection that could be offered through appointment of a proxy; and 2) proce-
dures for decisionmaking on behalf of incompetent patients who have not made a prior
declaration." SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS,
1987 EDITION 14 (1987).
247. McCabe Letter, supra note 5.
248. Id.
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subject. ' 249 After "assessing the proposed Act in the light of
Catholic moral principles," the Committee identified "at least
three serious problems not always encountered in laws of this
kind. ' 250 These problems are (1) the possible application of
the URTIA to authorize "withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment in cases where the patient could live a long time with
treatment but will die quickly without it"; (2) the failure to
require the continued administration of artificial nourishment;
and (3) the possible use of the pregnancy provision by a preg-
nant woman to refuse treatment that could save the life of her
fetus.25' According to the Committee, other problem areas
are: (1) the lack of a preamble asserting a presumption in
favor of life; (2) the failure to define "euthanasia"; (3) the
Act's "bias toward withdrawing treatment and even en-
courag[ing] such withdrawal in doubtful cases"; (4) the failure
to encourage communication among patient, family, and phy-
sician; and (5) the lack of a warning in the form directive,
which would caution a declarant that the directive may au-
thorize the abatement of artificial sustenance and may apply
in circumstances where the patient could live a long time with
continued treatment.5 2
As later discussion of recently enacted living will laws
will reveal, a number of compromises between opposition
groups have been made during the past several years. Many
of these compromises have operated to preclude the adoption
of the Uniform Act in its original form.
B. Influence of the URTIA on Laws
Enacted from 1985-88
1. Role of the Uniform Law Commissioners
The work of the ULC does not end with the final ap-
proval of a uniform act. Commissioners are expected to re-
turn to their home states and try to influence state legislatures
to enact the newly approved uniform law. The major
problems in securing state adoption of the URTIA have been
249. Committee for Pro-Life Activities, National Conference of Catholic Bishops,
Statement on Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, June 1986, 1.
250. Id. at 5.
251. Id. at 5-8.
252. Id. at 8-9.
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(1) the inherent opposition to anything new by a legal system
which is slow to change; (2) the completion of the Uniform
Act during the midst of a national debate over the nutrition
and hydration issue; (3) the relatively recent, but pre-URTIA,
adoption of living will laws in many states and the correlative
lack of enthusiasm to renew old battles without compelling
reasons to do so; and (4) a deeply rooted opposition to the
concept of living will legislation in most of the thirteen states
which have not enacted such laws.253
2. Overview of Legislative Activity Between 1985-88
Living will legislation has been enacted in sixteen
states254 since the first draft of the URTIA was circulated at
the annual meeting of the ULC in August of 1984. Three of
these states, South Carolina, Alaska, and Hawaii, 25 5 adopted
their laws in 1986, after the URTIA had been officially ap-
proved. Since its approval in August of 1985, the URTIA has
been introduced in at least seven other states: Arkansas, Kan-
sas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and
Rhode Island. However, none of these states has enacted it in
its official form.256
During this same time frame, several states have
253. McCabe Letter, supra note 5.
254. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (Supp. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Repl. 1987);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (West Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns Supp.
1988); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A. l to .11 (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614
(Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -104, -111, -201 to -206 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-
H:I to :16 (Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1989);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp.
1988). See Mooney, supra note 242, at 557-58 (commentary suggesting that Indiana's
1985 law be replaced with the Uniform Act).
255. South Carolina Death with Dignity Act (1986) (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10
to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988)); Alaska Rights of Terminally Ill Act (1986)
(ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to .100 (Supp. 1988)); Hawaii Medical Treatment Deci-
sions Act (1986) (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1987)).
256. Letter from John M. McCabe, Executive Director, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, to Marguerite Chapman (Sept. 25, 1987) (dis-
cussing Nebraska and North Dakota); Hite Letter, supra note 225 (discussing legislative
activities in many states).
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amended significantly their existing living will statutes. In
May of 1985, the Texas legislature passed a bill substantially
modifying its 1977 act by deleting the more restrictive provi-
sions and by adding mechanisms for (1) the appointment of a
health-care proxy and (2) decision-making on behalf of pa-
tients who have never executed directives.25 7 Amendments to
existing living will laws were also enacted in 1985 and 1986 by
the state legislatures of Idaho, Georgia, Louisiana, and Wis-
consin.258 In April of 1987, Arkansas replaced its 1977 legis-
lation with the Arkansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or
Permanently Unconscious Act.259
A close analysis of the sixteen living will statutes adopted
in 1985 and 1986, as well as the amendments to existing laws,
indicates that the influence of the Uniform Act has been some-
what limited. The Uniform Laws Annotated lists seven
states-Alaska, Arkansas, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, Montana,
257. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1989).
258. See IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985 & Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (amended 1987 Ga. Laws 488); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 -.10 (West Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 -.15 (West
Supp. 1988).
Idaho eliminated the five-year limitation on the effective period of a declaration;
dropped the requirement that a declaration be executed after certification of a terminal
condition; expressly authorized the appointment of a proxy decision-maker through the
execution of a durable power-of-attorney for health care; and prohibited the withdrawal
of artificially supplied hydration and nutrition. IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985
& Supp. 1988).
Georgia's 1986 amendments removed the seven-year limit on the period of effec-
tiveness of a living will; deleted the requirement that a living will exactly comply with
the statutory form; required expressed intent to revoke one's living will; and eased a
restriction that prohibited hospitals and other health-care facilities from preparing and
distributing living will forms. The new language adds the qualifier, "unless specifically
requested to do so by a person desiring to execute a living will." GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (amended 1987 Ga. Laws 488).
Louisiana dropped the restriction prohibiting certain health-care providers from
witnessing a declaration; removed certain procedural impediments for the execution of a
declaration on behalf of a minor; and authorized a declaration to be made orally or non-
verbally as well as in writing. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp.
1988).
Wisconsin eliminated the five-year limit on the period of effectiveness of a living
will; and removed the requirement that in order for treatment to be abated, physicians
must predict that death would occur within thirty days (instead, the physicians must
certify that the patient is in a terminal condition and that death is "imminent"). Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West Supp. 1988).
259. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Supp. 1987) (replaced ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (1977)).
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and Oklahoma-as jurisdictions which have adopted the Uni-
form Act.2" However, the table of adopting jurisdictions is
somewhat misleading, as shown by the fact that the General
Statutory Notes to the URTIA in Uniform Laws Annotated
acknowledge that these statutes are "substantial adoption[s] of
the major provisions of the Uniform Act."26'
The living will statutes adopted in Iowa, Maine, Mis-
souri, and Montana appear to be based predominantly upon
the tentative draft of the URTIA.262 However, Iowa, Maine,
and Missouri depart from the Uniform Act by specifically ex-
cluding artificial sustenance from the definition of life-
sustaining treatment.2 63  In addition, Iowa goes beyond the
URTIA by creating a decision-making mechanism for treat-
ment abatement of qualified patients who have never executed
living wills.264 In an unusual departure from the URTIA,
Missouri provides for forfeiture of testamentary gifts and de-
vises by anyone who, with actual knowledge of a declaration,
acts contrary to the expressed intention of the patient's
declaration.265
While the Alaska statute closely tracks the Uniform Act,
the Alaska legislature substantially strengthened its law by ad-
ding a provision that financially penalizes physicians who fail
to comply with the act.266 Another unique provision prohibits
260. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, "Table of Jurisdictions
Wherein Act Has Been Adopted," 9B U.L.A. 21 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
261. Id. at 610 (emphasis added).
262. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.l-.11 (West Supp. 1988), (amended H.F. 360,
1987 sess., 72nd Iowa General Assembly); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931
(Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -104, -111, -201 to -206 (1987).
263. IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.2(5) (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 2921(4) (Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
264. IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7(1)(a) (West Supp. 1988).
265. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.045(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989). Section 459.045(2) fur-
ther delineates that the penalty of loss of "rights of inheritance to the extent such loss is
provided for by the patient's last will and testament" only occurs where the action con-
trary to the patient's expressed intention is "without serious reason ... consistent with
the best interests of the patient." Id. (emphasis added).
266. ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.070(a) (Supp. 1988). This section specifically provides:
An attending physician who fails to comply with the declaration of a qualified
patient or to make the necessary arrangements to effect a transfer ... has no
right to compensation for medical services provided to a qualified patient after
withdrawal should have been effective or after transfer should have occurred
and may be liable to the qualified patient and to the heirs of the qualified
376
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charging a fee for preparation of a living will.2 67 Finally, the
Alaska act, unlike the URTIA, provides specifically that de-
clarants indicate whether life-sustaining procedures subject to
abatement should include artificially administered nutrition or
hydration.2 68
3. Arkansas Rights of the Terminally III or Permanently
Unconscious Act of 1987
Although the replacement statute adopted by Arkansas
in 1987 reflects the influence of the Uniform Act in several
respects,2 69 the new Arkansas law goes substantially beyond
the URTIA's provisions and is a much better law. Specifi-
cally, the 1987 Arkansas statute authorizes the appointment
of a health-care proxy 270 and includes the permanently
patient for a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000.00 plus the actual costs associa-
ted with the failure to comply with the declaration, and this shall be the exclu-
sive remedy at law for damages.
However, physicians, health-care professionals, and health-care facilities are im-
mune from civil or criminal liability for actions under the Alaska Rights of the Termi-
nally Ill Act "that are in accord with reasonable medical standards." Id.
§ 18.12.060(b).
Finally, section 18.12.070(b) states that any person who "wilfully conceals,
cancels, defaces, obliterates, or damages the declaration of another without the declar-
ant's consent or who falsifies or forges a revocation of the declaration of another may be
civilly liable to the qualified patient and to the heirs of the qualified patient."
267. Id. § 18.12.010(a).
268. Id. § 18.12.010(c). The form of declaration set forth in this section includes a
paragraph which the declarant may check indicating whether he does or does not "de-
sire that nutrition or hydration (food and water) be provided by gastric tube or intrave-
nously if necessary." However, a patient's declaration need not follow this form. Id.
269. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -213 (Supp. 1988). The provisions
of the 1987 Arkansas Act that relate to the transfer of patients, immunities of physi-
cians and other health-care providers, penalties, the recognition of declarations exe-
cuted out of state, certain miscellaneous matters, and aspects of the execution,
implementation, and revocation of a treatment declaration for an incurably or irreversi-
bly ill adult patient who is likely to die within a relatively short period of time appear to
closely track the language of the Uniform Act.
The Arkansas Bar Association sponsored the provisions of the 1987 Act that con-
cern the terminally ill, and the legislation as a whole was supported by the Arkansas
Medical Society, the Arkansas Hospital Association, and the Arkansas Nurses Associa-
tion. See SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 17
(1987). The act passed in the Arkansas House of Representatives by a vote of seventy to
nine, and in the Arkansas Senate by a vote of twenty-nine to zero. Id.
270. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-202(b), (c) (Supp. 1988). A health-care proxy is
someone who is age 18 or older "appointed by the patient as attorney-in-fact to make
health care decisions including the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment if a qualified patient, in the opinion of the attending physician, is permanently
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unconscious within its scope.271 It also establishes a mecha-
nism for executing a declaration on behalf of (1) a minor, or
(2) an adult lacking decisional capacity who has never exe-
cuted a treatment declaration or appointed a health-care
proxy.
272
These additions follow the recommendations of the Presi-
dent's Commission and other prominent authorities.273 As a
result, the new Arkansas statute is considered by some to be
one of the best laws in the nation 274 and should serve as a
model for improving the Uniform Act.
4. Oklahoma Natural Death Act of 1985
The Oklahoma Natural Death Act 275 differs so signifi-
cantly from the Uniform Act that any resemblance is
unconscious, incompetent, or otherwise mentally or physically incapable of communica-
tion." Id. § 20-17-201(10).
271. Id. §§ 20-17-202(b), (c). Life-sustaining treatment that may be abated includes
"any medical procedure or intervention that, when administered to a qualified patient,
will serve only.., to maintain the patient in a condition of permanent unconscious-
ness." Id. § 20-17-201(4). "Qualified patient" includes patients age 18 or older who
have been determined by the attending physician to be in "a permanently unconscious
state." Id. § 20-17-201(7). "Permanently unconscious" is defined as "a lasting condi-
tion, indefinitely without change in which thought, feeling, sensations, and awareness of
self and environment are absent." Id. § 20-17-201(11).
272. Id. § 20-17-214 (indicating who may execute a declaration on the patient's
behalf in such circumstances).
273. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 46, at 136-53, 193-94, 196.
See Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging
Technology and Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795 (1980); Note,
The Right to Die a Natural Death and the Living Will, 13 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 99 (1982)
(criticisms of the failure of existing statutes to include minors and adult patients who
lack capacity).
See also Annas & Glantz, The Right of Elderly Patients to Refuse Life-Sustaining
Treatment, 64 MILBANK QUARTERLY 95, 141 (Supp. 2, 1986) (critical analysis of limi-
tations of current statutes); Martyn & Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the
Terminally Ill: The Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779
(1984) (discussing mechanisms authorizing appointment of health-care decision-making
proxy); Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 985 (1984); Note, Proxy Decisionmaking for the Terminally I11: The Virginia Ap-
proach, 70 VA. L. REV. 1269 (1984).
274. Arkansas Enacts "Model" Statute, Society for the Right to Die Newsletter, Sum-
mer 1987, at 2 (commenting that the 1987 act "includes the best features of the 'Uni-
form Rights of the Terminally Ill Act' . . . and improves on it significantly...").
275. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1989). For a general
overview of the Oklahoma statute, see Logan, Oklahoma's Natural Death Act from a
Practitioner's Perspective, 57 OKLA. BAR J. 2315 (1985).
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superficial at best. Under the Oklahoma statute, the mini-
mum age for declarants is twenty-one years,276 rather than
eighteen as provided by the URTIA. The statute also requires
that death be "imminent whether or not [life-sustaining] pro-
cedures are utilized, ' 277 thus becoming operative for a much
narrower category of declarant's than does the URTIA. Also,
unlike the Uniform Act, Oklahoma expressly excludes "the
administration of nourishment, hydration and medication, or
the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary
to alleviate pain" from the definition of life-sustaining
treatment.278
The Oklahoma law's witness provisions are also much
more restrictive than those of the URTIA. Included among
the eight disqualifying criteria are provisions stipulating that
witnesses cannot be under twenty-one years of age or related
to the declarant by blood or marriage, 279 and that the declara-
tion must be notarized.28° Oklahoma also departs from the
Uniform Act in terms of the scope and type of pregnancy
276. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3102(2)(5) to -3103(D) (West Supp. 1989).
277. Id. § 3102(4).
278. Id. More recently, the Oklahoma legislature in 1987 enacted the Hydration
and Nutrition for Incompetent Patients Act, which applies to all "incompetent" pa-
tients, regardless of whether they have executed a treatment declaration. Id. §§ 3080.1
to .5. With this law, Oklahoma became the first and only state to directly prohibit court
authorization of withdrawal of artificially supplied sustenance and hydration from in-
competent patients. Id. § 3080.5. The constitutionality of the 1987 Oklahoma Nutri-
tion and Hydration for Incompetent Patients Act is questionable in view of the many
judicial decisions holding that the right of the patient or surrogate decision-maker to
refuse artificial nourishment and hydration is protected by the federal constitutional
privacy right to die. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 57 U.S.L.W. 1065, 2256 (D.R.I. Oct. 17,
1988) (No. 87-0573B); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987); In re Peter ex rel. Johan-
ning, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398
Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
See also, Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review
denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986) (holding that the right of the surrogate decision-
maker of a patient in a persistent vegetative state to refuse sustenance is constitutionally
protected and is not abrogated by the Florida Life-Prolonging Procedure Act).
279. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3103(B) (West Supp. 1989). This section also
disqualifies as a witness any person who is: (1) financially responsible for the declarant's
medical care; (2) entitled to part of the declarant's estate under a will, codicil, or by
operation of law; (3) the declarant's attending physician; (4) an employee of the attend-
ing physician or an employee of a health-care facility in which the declarant is a patient;
(5) another patient in the same health-care facility where the declarant is a patient; or
(6) someone who has a claim against part of the declarant's estate at the time the direc-
tive is executed. Id.
280. Id. § 3103(C).
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limitation which may be included.81
In Oklahoma, two physicians must certify in writing that
the patient is in a terminal condition.28 2 Furthermore, unless
a patient executes or reexecutes a declaration after having
been certified as in a terminal condition, the directive is not
binding on the attending physician.2 3 Moreover, even when
the directive has been executed or reexecuted subsequent to a
terminal diagnosis, Oklahoma stipulates that "[n]o physician
or health care professional ... shall be civilly or criminally
liable for failing to comply with the directive of a qualified
patient. ' 28 4 Unlike the Uniform Act's misdemeanor penalties
for willfully failing to transfer a qualified patient or to record
the determination of a terminal condition, the most severe
281. Id § 3103(D). The Oklahoma law's only pregnancy limitation is in the stat-
ute's "Directive to Physicians," with which form a declarant's directive shall "substan-
tially" comply. The pertinent paragraph of the statutory form provides that if the
declarant has been diagnosed as pregnant and the declarant's physician knows of the
diagnosis, the directive shall have no force or effect during the course of the declarant's
pregnancy. Id.
The Oklahoma statute does not indicate to what extent a female declarant may
modify the pregnancy clause and still "substantially" follow the statutory form. Under
federal constitutional law, a terminally ill declarant should retain the right to modify
the clause by making it apply only when the fetus is viable. Cf Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1987). For a thoughtful analysis of the ethical and legal issues presented by
advances in neonatal care that have lowered the age of viability to twenty-four weeks
and occasionally to twenty-two or twenty-three weeks, see Callahan, How Technology Is
Refraining the Abortion Debate, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP., 33 (February 1986).
282. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 3102(7) (West Supp. 1989). The written determi-
nation that the patient is afflicted with a terminal condition must be signed, dated, and
filed with the patient's chart, and one copy must be given to the patient's hospital or
nursing home. The two physicians include the attending physician and another chosen
either by the patient or by the attending physician. All requirements to attain the status
of "qualified patient" must be fulfilled before the full panoply of legal protections af-
forded the attending physician are effectuated. Id.
283. Id. § 3107(B), (C). With regard to patients who were determined to be in a
terminal condition and who lost decisional capacity after a declaration had been exe-
cuted, the attending physician is given some discretion. In these circumstances, "the
attending physician may give weight to the directive as evidence of the directions of the
patient" regarding the abatement of life-sustaining treatment and "may consider other
factors such as information from the affected family or the nature of the illness, injury,
or disease of the patient in determining whether the totality of circumstances known to
the attending physician justifies effectuating the directive." Id. § 3107(C) (emphasis
added).
284. Id. § 3107(B). However, an attending physician who refuses to comply with a
qualified patient's directive is required to transfer the patient to another physician. Id.
380
sanction for an attending physician in comparable circum-
stances is a determination of unprofessional conduct.285
Finally, the Oklahoma Natural Death Act lacks provi-
sions recognizing declarations executed in compliance with
the laws of other states; giving effect to instruments executed
prior to the operative date of the new statute; or expressly pre-
serving the right of a patient to make treatment abatement
decisions as long as the patient is able to do so. Oklahoma's
new statute is one of the most restrictive such laws in the na-
tion. The Oklahoma modifications of the Uniform Act are so
radical that any similarities between the two are difficult to
discern.
5. Relationship of URTIA to Other Aspects
of State Laws
Many recently adopted and amended statutes reflect ap-
proaches included in a number of older statutes and incorpo-
rated into the Uniform Act. Thus, it is hard to say whether
their influence was more from the Uniform Act or the pre-
dating statutes of other states. For example, the newly en-
acted laws of eight states-Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Mary-
land, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah-all
require that the directive of a qualified patient be incorporated
into the declarant's medical records.28 6 Provisions requiring
285. Id. §§ 3107(B), (D) (emphasis added). The physician's behavior may consti-
tute unprofessional conduct if (1) the physician fails to comply with the directive and
either refuses to make the necessary arrangements to transfer the patient or fails to
transfer the patient to another physician who will comply with the directive of the quali-
fied patient, and/or (2) the physician fails either to provide written certification of the
terminal condition of the declarant or to transfer the declarant to another physician
who will so certify the declarant's condition. Id.
See Physician Refuses to Cut Off Patient from Feeding Tubes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9,
1987, at 11, col. 3 (nat'l ed.) (physician refused to obey court order to terminate life-
sustaining treatment). For an interesting examination of the ethical issues posed in
these circumstances, compare Jay, The Judge Ordered Me to Kill My Patient, MED.
ECON., Aug. 10, 1987, at 41 (reflecting the view of the physician) with Odd Judicial
Decisions in CA Nursing Home Case Raise Grim Possibility, CONCERN FOR DYING
NEWSLET-rER, Summer, 1987, at 4 (providing a more detailed account of the perspec-
tive of the patient's family).
286. AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202(B) (1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-
104(1) (Repl. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-14(b) (Bums Supp. 1988); MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602(b)(3) (Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-
H:5 (Supp. 1988) (placed into medical record upon request of person executing the doc-
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physicians who decline to honor a living will to transfer care
to another physician are included in the new laws of these
same eight states, 287 although the statutes vary with regard to
sanctions for failure to comply. 288  Finally, Indiana, New
Hampshire, Tennessee, and Utah, like the URTIA, provide
that nothing in the act shall impair or supersede any right or
responsibility of a person to have medical treatment abated.289
6. Summary of Legislative Trends
Twenty-five statutes concerning this topic have been
adopted by states since January of 1983.290 Nearly two-thirds
ument); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102(3) (West Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 32-11-104(b) (Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1110 (Supp. 1988).
287. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3204(B) (1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-
113(5) (Repl. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-14(e) (Burns Supp. 1988); MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-604(b) (Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-
H:6(II) (Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3107(B) (West Supp. 1989); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a) (Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112(2) (Supp.
1988).
288. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-113(5) (Repl. 1987) (unprofessional conduct sanc-
tion for refusal to comply and failure to transfer); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-22 (Bums
Supp. 1988) (medical licensing board disciplinary sanctions for knowingly violating the
statute); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3107(B), (D) (West Supp. 1989) (failure to cer-
tify the patient's terminal condition and/or refusal to comply or failure to transfer may
constitute unprofessional conduct); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a) (Supp. 1988)
(failure to make good faith reasonable efforts to comply results in civil liability and
professional disciplinary action, including possibility of revocation or suspension of li-
cense); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112(3) (Supp. 1988) (failure to comply or effect a
transfer constitutes unprofessional conduct).
289. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-18(e) (Burns Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 137-H:16 (Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-1 10(d) (Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-1117(4) (Supp. 1988).
290. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (Supp. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); COLO' REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Repl. 1987);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-
.15 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1988); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, paras. 701-710
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Bums Supp. 1988);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A. 1 -.11 (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:1299.58.1-. 10 (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931
(Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1988); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055
(Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -104, -111, -201 to -206
(1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to :16 (Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992
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of these were enacted since the draft of the URTIA was read
for the first time at the 1984 annual meeting of the ULC.2 91 In
addition, a number of states have passed significant amend-
ments or replacements to their older laws.
Although there are exceptions, such as the 1987 Arkan-
sas act, many of the state statutes and amendments of recent
vintage reflect a number of compromises which have been
made in adopting the laws. A number of these compromises
have apparently resulted from the changing tactics and em-
phasis of the Committee for Pro-Life Activities of the Na-
tional Conference of Catholic Bishops.292 The Committee for
Pro-Life Activities reportedly considered state court decisions
such as Conroy to be "odious. ' 293 Consequently, the Commit-
tee worked to influence new living will legislation which
(Repl. 1988); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (Repl. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-
.15 (West Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (Supp. 1988).
291. Thirteen states enacted natural death statutes in 1985: Arizona Medical Treat-
ment Decision Act, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); Colorado
Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Repl. 1987);
Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-
570 to -575 (Supp. 1988); Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act,
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-1 1-1 to -22 (Burns Supp. 1988); Iowa Life-Sustaining Proce-
dures Act, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1-.11 (West Supp. 1988); Maine Living Wills
Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (Supp. 1988); Maryland Life-Sus-
taining Procedures Act, MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1988);
Missouri Life Support Declarations Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon
Supp. 1989); Montana Living Will Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -104, -111, -
201 to -206 (1987); New Hampshire Terminal Care Document Act, N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 137-H:1 -:16 (Supp. 1988); Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1987); Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act, TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1988); and Utah Personal Choice and Living
Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1988). See also, Otten, New
Wills, supra note 85, at 33, col. 4 (charting the enactment of state living will laws chron-
ologically from 1976 through 1985). Three states enacted such legislation in 1986.
Alaska Rights of Terminally Ill Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (Supp. 1988);
Hawaii Medical Treatment Decisions Act, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp.
1987); South Carolina Death with Dignity Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
292. Otten, New Wills, supra note 85 at 33, col. 4 (describing the "significant switch
in tactics and emphasis, if not a reversal of position" made by the Committee for Pro-
Life Activities during the fall of 1984). Father Edward Bryce, the director of the Com-
mittee for Pro-Life Activities, reportedly explained that while the Committee continued
to view living will legislation as unnecessary, this position "has to be processed through
the realities in each state." Id.
293. Id. Father Bryce, the director of the Committee, said: "'States without legis-
lation were having problems that were being handled by the courts, often with decisions
we found really odious.'" Id.
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would preclude similar results in the future. Typical of these
were provisions (1) specifying that living will declarations had
no force if the patient were pregnant, and (2) excluding artifi-
cially supplied nutrition and hydration from the life-
sustaining procedures that may be withdrawn. 294  The
Oklahoma legislation, for example, reflects the work of such
activists.
Unfortunately, as the Executive Director of Concern for
Dying has noted, such compromises have produced "new laws
[which] simply make the whole process much more compli-
cated and ambiguous. '295 In fact, many new laws may be a
step backward in the movement to secure and enhance the
rights of patients to control fateful treatment choices.
V. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION
A. Advance Planning for Health Care Purposes
Advance planning for health care purposes, including the
desire to control to what extent, if any, life-prolonging treat-
ment will be utilized, has been the subject of increased atten-
tion as a result of both the aging of the American population
and the AIDS epidemic. This national focus of attention cre-
ates a very practical need for flexible legal mechanisms that
will enable an ever-increasing portion of the American popu-
lation to make treatment decisions in advance or to set stan-
dards for and authorize the appointment of trusted friends or
family members to act as surrogate health-care decision-
makers.296
Along with the ever-growing accumulation of experience
relative to decision-making concerning the abatement of life-
sustaining treatment, something of a consensus has emerged
on a number of the issues that have impeded efforts to enact
flexible and practical natural death laws. Although disagree-
ment will inevitably exist on some issues, most medical
294. Id.
295. Id. Oklahoma's 1985 Natural Death Act was identified as illustrative of legis-
lation that complicated the decision-making process. Id.
296. Special Report, Preferences of Homosexual Men with AIDS for Life-Sustaining
Treatment, supra note 2, at 457.
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ethicists, physicians, and courts which have addressed right-
to-die questions concur on these important points:
(1) No difference exists, analytically, between artifi-
cially supplied sustenance and any other medical treatment.297
(2) A constitutional privacy right allows control of fun-
damental medical decisions affecting one's body, including the
right to refuse life-extending treatment, and this right should
prevail in the absence of a sufficiently compelling governmen-
tal interest in forcing treatment on a patient.298
(3) The constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment, which is also supported by the patient's common
law right of self-determination and, in some jurisdictions, a
state constitutional right of privacy, extends to patients who
no longer have decisional capacity as long as there is clear and
convincing evidence that the patient, if competent, would de-
cline treatment.299
(4) Under appropriate circumstances, the family or
guardian may order the abatement of life-extending treatment,
including artificial nourishment, on behalf of a patient who
lacks capacity to make medical decisions.
(5) When the physician's perceived duty to sustain life
conflicts with the decision of the patient or that patient's sur-
rogate decision-maker to decline medical treatment, the
choice of the patient or the substitute decision-maker should
prevail.3°'
Since the approval of the URTIA in August of 1985, the
most important factors leading to this consensus have been
(1) the issuance of the March 15, 1986, Opinion of the AMA
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs on Withholding or
Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment; (2) the
ever-increasing number of federal and state court decisions
recognizing a constitutional privacy right to die and determin-
ing that the artificial administration of nutrition and hydra-
297. Annas, supra note 63, at 685.
298. Id.
299. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, -, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (1985).
300. Annas, Fashion and Freedom, supra note 63, at 685; Areen, The Legal Status
of Consent Obtained from Families of Adult Patients to Withhold or Withdraw Treat-
ment, 258 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 229 (1987).
301. AMA Opinion, supra note 191, at para. 1.
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tion is not legally different from any other medical treatment
that may be declined; and (3) the 1987 publication of Guide-
lines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the
Care of the Dying by the Hastings Center.30 2 Greater media
attention30 3 and increased public education regarding the diffi-
cult ethical, medical, and legal issues posed by the right-to-die
cases also have likely contributed to the emergence of this
consensus.
On balance, the judiciary has done a far superior job of
protecting the right of patients to refuse medical treatment
than have the state legislatures. Yet the courts continue to
implore the legislative branch to formulate laws addressing
the many complex issues involving medical decision-making
for the terminally ill and the permanently unconscious.
Unfortunately, in view of the compromising nature of most
natural death statutes adopted between 1983 and 1988, a
greater need than ever before exists for a comprehensive, well-
crafted uniform law on this subject.
The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, as the title
of this article suggests, clearly is "too little, too late" to con-
vince state legislators to push for its adoption. The goals of
the drafters of the Uniform Act were too modest, and even so,
the ULC failed to completely achieve all their stated
objectives.
B. Success of the URTIA Relative to
Goals of the Drafters
The three stated purposes of the ULC in promulgating
the URTIA were to (1) draft an act which is "simple, effec-
tive, and acceptable" both to persons desiring to execute a
declaration and to health-care professionals and providers;
(2) provide for the effectiveness of a living will "in states other
than the state in which it is executed through uniformity of
302. Hastings Center Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment
and the Care of the Dying (1987) [hereinafter Hastings Center Guidelines].
303. See, e.g., Who Lives, Who Dies (PBS Oct. 1987); Dying with Dignity (KTLA
television broadcast, Apr. 4, 1987); Mercy or Murder (NBC television broadcast, Jan.
11, 1987).
304. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 529 A.2d 434 (1987) and In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529
A.2d 404 (1987) are examples.
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scope and procedure"; and (3) "avoid the inconsistency in ap-
proach" which had characterized existing state living will
laws.30 5 The extent to which the ULC fulfilled these objectives
is best assessed by examining each goal separately.
1. Simplicity, Effectiveness, and
Acceptability of the URTIA
The first objective focuses upon the simplicity, effective-
ness, and acceptability of the URTIA both to individuals who
wish to execute advance directives and to the affected health-
care providers.3 °6 The URTIA should be quite acceptable to
physicians and health-care facilities. Like the state living will
laws which precede it, the Uniform Act confers immunity
from civil and criminal liability and from unprofessional con-
duct actions upon persons who carry out valid patient
declarations.0 7
Even though the URTIA imposes sanctions upon a phy-
sician who willfully fails to record the determination of termi-
nal condition or who willfully fails to transfer a patient when
the attending physician is unwilling to implement the declara-
tion, no penalties are imposed upon physicians and other
health-care providers who refuse to comply with a patient's
declaration when acting "in accord with reasonable medical
standards. 3 0 8 Furthermore, another section of the Uniform
Act expressly confers immunity from criminal or civil liability
or professional disciplinary actions upon health-care providers
whose actions are in accord with reasonable medical
standards."°
The "reasonable medical standards" qualifier is obviously
beneficial to physicians. However, the qualifier also creates a
potential escape hatch which may prove disconcerting to pa-
tients seeking to execute binding advance declarations. 31 0
This problem, coupled with the narrow scope of the URTIA
and its failure to authorize proxy directives, may actually
305. URTIA, supra note 3, at Preamble.
306. Id. at Preamble, para. 2.
307. Id. § 8 & comment.
308. Id. § 10(f).
309. Id. § 8(b).
310. Annas & Glantz, supra note 237, at 143-44.
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make the Uniform Act less effective and acceptable to most
patients.
As discussed in Part III of this article, the URTIA is an
improvement from the patient's point of view over many state
living will laws. The Uniform Act simplifies procedures for
executing a living will and loosens other restrictions found in
some state statutes. On the other hand, short-comings of the
Act include:
(1) The definition of "life-sustaining treatment" is un-
duly restrictive. The qualifier, "will only serve to prolong the
dying process," if read literally, would never be applied be-
cause physicians should not administer unnecessary or inap-
propriate treatment. 31' A more practical definition is
provided by the Hastings Center's Guidelines: "Life-
sustaining treatment is any medical intervention, technology,
procedure, or medication that is administered to a patient in
order to forestall the moment of death, whether or not the
treatment is intended to affect the underlying life-threatening
disease(s) or biologic processes. ' 312
(2) In view of the consensus that artificially supplied
nutrition and hydration are no different, analytically, from
any other medical treatment, the Uniform Act should explic-
itly state in the definition of life-sustaining treatment that arti-
ficial sustenance is a medical procedure that may be withheld
or withdrawn.13
(3) The Uniform Act should expressly require the pro-
vision of palliative care to the patient. Palliative care includes
medical, surgical, and other procedures used to alleviate suf-
fering and discomfort. Patients who decline a particular
medical treatment or procedure should not be deprived of
medical or nursing care for the relief of pain or the easing of
discomfort.
(4) While the definition of "terminal condition" repre-
sents an improvement over a number of existing statutes, it is
still much too narrow. Minimally, the Uniform Act should
311. Id. at 142-43.
312. Hastings Center Guidelines, supra note 302, at 4.
313. See, e.g., Appendix 2, Right to Refuse Treatment Act, Annas & Glantz, supra
note 237, at 156, § 1 (listing artificial feeding as one example of treatment that may be
withheld).
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extend to all patients who no longer have decision-making ca-
pacity and who have previously expressed their wishes, in a
clear and convincing manner, to decline treatment and let na-
ture take its course.
(5) The revocation section should be modified by delet-
ing the language "without regard to [the declarant's] mental
... condition." To recognize the revocation of a directive by a
declarant who lacks decisional capacity and, therefore, does
not appreciate such action, "negates the very essence of what
the act seeks to promote: self determination."3 4
(6) The pregnancy provision should be redrafted to
clearly state that it only suspends the operative effect of a
pregnant patient's declaration when there is a reasonable
probability of the development of the fetus to the point of live
birth if the mother receives continued medical treatment.
(7) Language should be added to the "transfer of pa-
tients" section delineating the course of action to be followed
in the event the "unwilling" attending physician or other
health-care provider, after taking "all reasonable steps," is un-
able to transfer the patient to someone who will honor the
patient's wishes.31 5 On the infrequent occasions when this sit-
uation arises, the patient's right to decline treatment should
prevail over the views of the physician or other health-care
provider who disagrees with the treatment abatement
decision.31 6
(8) The Uniform Act should require that institutions,
including nursing homes, which mandate certain treatments
or limit the right of patients to forgo treatment, must notify
patients and their surrogate decision-makers of these policies
upon admission.31 7
(9) The reasonable medical standards qualifier should
be redrafted to more carefully circumscribe physician
discretion.31 8
314. Id. at 143.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See Hastings Center Guidelines, supra note 302, at 33 (stating that the institu-
tion should publicize its policies, including notifying patients and surrogates as early as
possible upon admission).
318. Annas & Glantz, supra note 237, at 144; Marzen, supra note 232, at 475.
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(10) The penalties section should be expanded to im-
pose a sanction against a physician or other health-care pro-
vider who fails to comply with the declaration of a qualified
patient or, in the alternative, effectuate transfer.31 9 In addi-
tion, a more meaningful and administratively efficient
sanction than the current misdemeanor penalty should be pre-
scribed for willful failure to transfer or record the determina-
tion of terminal condition.320
In sum, the Uniform Act contains a number of significant
shortcomings which undermine its utility to individuals seek-
ing mechanisms for securing and enhancing their right to de-
cline life-extending medical treatment. While the first
objective of the ULC may have been fulfilled with regard to
health-care providers, this goal has been only partially
achieved relative to the needs and desires of patients.
2. Extraterritorial Effectiveness of Living Wills
The second objective of the ULC, that of providing for
the effectiveness of a living will in states other than the juris-
diction in which it was executed through uniformity of scope
and procedure, is arguably achieved through the very drafting
and approval of the Uniform Act.32' In addition, the URTIA
provides that a declaration executed in compliance with the
laws of another state is to be treated as validly executed in the
enacting state.32 2 However, recognition of a declaration may
not be assumed because, as the comment explains, its opera-
tion in the enacting state is subject to that state's substantive
policies.3 23 Finally, if the improvements offered by the Uni-
form Act are not sufficiently compelling to convince state leg-
islators to adopt the URTIA or to amend existing state living
will laws to conform more closely to it, the second goal cannot
be fulfilled.
319. Annas & Glantz, supra note 237, at 143-44.
320. One appropriate penalty is that imposed in Alaska, where a physician failing to
comply with a declaration or make a transfer is denied part of the fee for medical serv-
ices. The physician may also be liable for a civil penalty. See supra note 266 (quoting
ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.070(a)).
321. URTIA, supra note 3, at Preamble.
322. Id. § 12.
323. Id. § 12 & comment.
390
3. Avoidance of Inconsistent Approaches
in Existing Laws
The third purpose of the URTIA is to avoid the inconsis-
tent approaches of the early living will statutes.324 While by
definition the URTIA provides a uniform approach to the
preparation and implementation of terminally ill patients' ad-
vance treatment directives, actual consistency and conformity
will depend upon the extent to which the commissioners are
able to convince state legislators of the need for and utility of
enacting it.
C. The Need for a More Comprehensive Uniform Act
The most significant shortcomings of the URTIA are:
(1) the failure to provide a mechanism for the appointment of
a proxy decision-maker for health-care purposes; (2) the lack
of procedures governing non-terminal, permanently uncon-
scious patients; and (3) the failure to establish a decision-
making process for the abatement of medical treatment on be-
half of the patient who lacks decisional capacity and who has
neither executed a valid treatment directive nor appointed a
health-care proxy.325 Unfortunately, nothing exists to fill the
sizable void left by the Uniform Act with regard to these three
broad categories. Accordingly, the URTIA may be consid-
ered more remarkable for those patients it excludes than for
those it includes.
1. The Need for a Mechanism for the Appointment
of a Health-Care Proxy
As discussed previously, the value of a personally ap-
pointed surrogate decision-maker has been recognized by sev-
eral right-to-die authorities.326 The natural death statutes of
thirteen states327 now provide mechanisms for the designation
of a proxy or surrogate health-care decision-maker. Ameri-
cans who are concerned about the inflexibility or rigidity of
324. Id. at Preamble.
325. Annas & Glantz, supra note 237, at 142-43. Moreover, the Model Health Care
Consent Act of 1982 clearly does not fill the void left by URTIA.
326. See supra notes 246, 273 and accompanying text.
327. The states are Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Virginia, Wyoming, Colorado,
Indiana, Iowa, Utah, Idaho, Texas, Hawaii, and Arkansas.
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treatment directives should have the clearly established option
of appointing a proxy for health-care decision-making. They
should not have to leave to chance or to litigation the question
of whether a form treatment directive can be modified to des-
ignate a proxy in states not insistent upon precise
conformance with a statutory form.3 28  Nor should they have
to leave unresolved the question of whether a state's durable
power-of-attorney law encompasses the appointment of a
health-care proxy.329 The failure of the URTIA to expressly
authorize the execution of a health-care proxy directive was
extremely shortsighted.
328. Approximately half of the state natural death statutes, as well as the Uniform
Act, allow a declarant to modify the directions set forth in the declaration. See Gel-
fand, The First Decade, supra note 17, at 753 & nn.63, 64. In those jurisdictions, it may
be possible to vary the declaration to include the appointment of a medical decision-
making agent. Id. at 795. See also Cohen, Appointing a Proxy for Health-Care Deci-
sions, Society for the Right to Die, 6 (Monograph) (September, 1986) (stating that thirty-
six of the thirty-nine jurisdictions with living will statutes do not require a specific form
be followed, and thus may permit proxy appointments).
329. An excellent student note identified three "potential infirmities" in the author-
ity of an agent to make health-care decisions for an incapacitated patient pursuant to a
durable power-of-attorney law: (1) whether the making of health-care decisions is a
"nondelegable act" under the law of agency; (2) whether a durable power-of-attorney
can be used in a medical decision-making context; and (3) whether the use of a durable
power-of-attorney might conflict with existing guardianship laws. See Note, Appointing
an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 985, 1009 (1984). In
an incisive analysis of these potential problems, the author concluded that while "the
laws provide no effective mechanism whereby the patient can ensure that his choice of
treatment will be respected," the arguments against the use of durable powers-of-
attorney are unconvincing. Id. at 1031. Therefore, "[a]gency is a simple, workable
mechanism that could bring greater certainty to the law while furthering the traditional
freedom of patients to make their own decisions regarding the course of their medical
care. Id.
The President's Commission also thought that the language of existing durable
power-of-attorney statutes could accommodate the appointment of a surrogate for
health-care decision-making on behalf of patients who had lost capacity. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION REPORT, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra
note 46, at 147. Certainly, nothing in the durable power-of-attorney statutes expressly
precludes such modifications. More importantly, as the President's Commission noted,
the utilization of durable power-of-attorney statutes for health-care decision-making on
behalf of incapacitated patients presents the "possibility for abuse inherent in the stat-
utes." Because durable power-of-attorney laws were designed for small estates to
obviate the expense of full guardianship or conservatorship proceedings, greater proce-
dural safeguards may be needed for medical decision-making purposes. Id.
For an in-depth examination of the use of state durable power-of-attorney statutes
for health-care decision-making, see Cohen, supra note 328, at 2-6.
2. The Need for Decision-Making Mechanisms that
Encompass the Permanently Unconscious
Eleven states have living will statutes that address
decision-making on behalf of permanently unconscious pa-
tients who are not terminally ill.330 In view of the number of
landmark cases involving the permanently unconscious and
the judicial affirmation of the right of a surrogate to make a
treatment abatement decision on behalf of such an individ-
ual,33' a clear need exists for extending the scope of living will
laws to include these patients.
3. The Need for Decision-Making Mechanisms for
Patients Who Lack Capacity or Who Do Not
Have a Directive
Because most Americans never execute property wills, 332
there is little reason to expect any significant difference with
respect to the use of living wills. In addition, in most states
minors and patients who have always lacked decisional
capacity cannot execute valid treatment or proxy directives.
Although medical decisions on behalf of these individuals
have traditionally been made informally by the patients' fami-
lies and physicians, this process typically breaks down when
the family and the physicians disagree about the use of a par-
ticular procedure.333 Thus, there is a need for a legal mecha-
nism for decision-making on behalf of those who lack capacity
and who have never executed a directive of any kind. Only
eleven states currently have natural death statutes which
encompass these patients.34
330. The states are Arkansas, North Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, Virginia, New
Mexico, Oregon, Connecticut, Iowa, Utah, and Texas.
331. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub noma. Garger
v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), overruled in part, In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486
A.2d 1209 (1987).
332. Professors Scoles and Halbach have observed that "[d]espite the reasons for
disposing of one's property by will or even by trust, most Americans die intestate." E.
SCOLES & E. HALBACH, JR., PROBLEMS & MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES &
TRUSTS 13 (3rd ed., 1981).
333. Areen, supra note 300.
334. The states are Arkansas, North Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, Virginia, New
Mexico, Oregon, Connecticut, Iowa, Utah, and Texas.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The limited influence of the Uniform Rights of the Ter-
minally Ill Act during the biennium that began in January,
1987, suggests very little potential for widespread acceptance
of the Act. Most of the twenty-five legislatures that have en-
acted laws since 1983 simply will not be anxious to again
engage in battles so recently fought. As long as the improve-
ments over existing laws are modest in scope and applicable to
only a small portion of the American population, little enthu-
siasm to push for the adoption of the URTIA is likely to en-
sue. Moreover, the twelve states still without living will
legislation are the ones that most successfully resisted right-
to-die legislation before the Uniform Act was approved. In
order to be adopted, the Uniform Act will have to overcome
residual objection in those states.
Finally, patients in situations not covered by the URTIA
have been the focus of most of the landmark state appellate
court decisions. By deciding to draft a narrow uniform law,
the Uniform Law Commissioners missed an important oppor-
tunity to provide leadership in this area.
Just as the Commissioners returned to the drafting table
to prepare a better "brain death" act,335 they should begin
anew to draft a URTIA that truly accomplishes what the tftle
of the act suggests---coverage of much broader categories of
dying patients. They should prepare a completely new uni-
form act that will transcend the modest improvements of the
URTIA and the superficial approach of its forerunner, the
Model Health Care Consent Act.
Ultimately, the success of the Uniform Law Commission-
ers will require drafting a comprehensive act that is consonant
with the ethical, medical, and judicial consensus that has
emerged on the most important issues affecting dying patients.
As this article has endeavored to point out, the need is great
and the time is right.
335. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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